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Professor Grant Gilmore described contract as theory "dedicated 
to the proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for 
anything. "1 In his introduction to The Death of Contract, Gilmore 
agreed with those scholars who had pronounced the creature dead,2 
but rejected their conclusion that contract theory is no longer worthy 
of attention. He wrote: 
In plotting our course, the best we have to go by is some knowledge of 
where we have come from. The most lovingly detailed knowledge of the 
present state of things begins to become useful to us only when we are in 
a position to compare it with what we know about what was going on 
last year and the year before that and so on back through the floating 
mists of time. 3 
Gihnore's stated purpose in writing The Death of Contract was to ex-
amine the past as a guide to the future. The book offers an analysis of 
where we are and have been as a tool for understanding where we 
may go. 
In brief, The Death of Contract presents contract as a theory of 
life developed by and for a particular kind of being-a nineteenth-
century individualist of the Oliver Wendell Holmes variety- and ex-
plains the passing of contract as the inevitable consequence of a 
change in the world's inhabitants.4 Contract has died, according to 
Gihnore, because individualists have died. People now are interde-
pendent cogs. We cogs, according to Gilmore, seek relationships and 
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. For many engaging conversations 
about contract, I am grateful to the contract law teachers in the informal Contracts Teaching 
Committee of the American Association of Law Schools, Section on Women in Legal Education. 
I am grateful to Carolyn DiPalma for helping me understand Donna Haraway, and to Ron Col-
lins and Janice Weir for generous comments and conversation regarding this Article. Although 
Deborah Waire Post and Sharon K . Hom would disagree with much of this Article, it is rooted in 
our three year conversation about contract law and in the set of course materials that we are co-
editing, CoNTRACTING LAw: A SET oF CouRsE MATERIALS (forthcoming 1996), and I am 
deeply grateful to them. 
1 GRANT GtLMORE, THE DEATH oF CoNTRACT 15 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed. , 2d ed. 1995). 
2 ld. at 1, 113-14 n.l. Professor Gilmore named Professor Stuart Macaulay as "Lord High 
Executioner of the Contract is Dead schooL" ld. at 113-14 n.l. 
3 ld. at 2. 
4 See id. at 103-04. This account of Gilmore's thesis is discussed at greater length infra notes 
45-50 and accompanying text. 
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90: !32 (1995) Cogs or Cyborgs? 
erceive obligations very differently from our atomistic ancestors and 
fhus we develop very differen~ law. Gilmore predict~, then, that con-
!ract Jaw will reflect norm~ of ~terdependence and will feature values 
of trust, reliance, and reciprocity. 
The Death of Contract has failed in its declared purpose. Its ac-
count of the life and power of contract has turned out to be a mislead-
ing guide to the future of contract law. Others would argue that this 
stated purpose was not Gilmore's real purpose, that he actually meant 
to provoke deeper analysis of contract theory, to lay groundwork for a 
more complete critique of the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, or 
~erely to amuse his colleagues, and that the book succeeded in these 
other goals. That may be so; and I do not wish to contest the contri-
bution The Death of Contract has made. But I do want to focus on its 
failure as prediction. As Gilmore observed, "it is possible to learn as 
much from a failed experiment as from a successful one,"5 and there is 
much to learn from the failure of The Death of Contract. In addition, 
Gilmore's predictions clearly invite play with world-inhabiting figures 
and their ethics, politics, and law, and he's right, it is fun to play. 
The first section of this Article discusses two of the most notable 
predictive failures of The Death of Contract, regarding the doctrines of 
reliance and unjust enrichment, and suggests that these failures were 
caused by Gilmore's underestimation of the persistence of contract 
ideology. The second section features some contemporary contract 
theories, focusing especially on their understandings of the persistence 
and meaning of contract. This sampling will be necessarily incom-
plete, presented as a kind of conversation and offered to fill in some of 
the silence in Gilmore's analysis. The final section joins with Gil-
more's play of world-inhabitants and suggests that it is better to imag-
ine ourselves cyborgs rather than cogs, for cyborgs seek active and 
multiple connection, while cogs live mind- and spirit-deadening coex-
istence. In furtherance of this cyborgian search, this section points to 
two engaging lines of interdisciplinary work that offer direction for 
future contract theorizing. 
I. ON THE PURPORTED BIRTH OF INTERDEPENDENCE: 
BLASPHEMY AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF CONTRACT 
The Death of Contract sends forth a birth announcement: 
We are fast approaching the point where, to prevent unjust enrichment, 
any benefit received by a defendant must be paid for unless it was clearly 
meant as a gift, where any detriment reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in 
reliance on a defendant's assurances must be recompensed. When that 
point is reached, there is really no longer any viable distinction between 
liability in contract and liability in tort. 
5 /d. at 111. 
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... I have occasionally suggested to my students that a desirable 
reform in legal education would be to merge the first-year courses in 
Contracts and Torts into a single course which we would call Contorts. 
Perhaps the same suggestion would be a good one when the time comes 
for the third round of Restatements.6 
For Gilmore, Contorts was the new field being formed by the reab-
sorption of contract into tort.7 Two main components of Contorts 
were unjust enrichment, as it is transitionally stated in Section 86 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and promissory estoppel, as it 
is firmly stated in Section 90. "Speaking descriptively," Gilmore con-
cluded, "we might say that what is happening is that 'contract' is being 
reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort.' "8 As contract rules dis-
solve, "the two fields . · .. are gradually merging and becoming one."9 
The birth announcement of Contorts was as exciting as a circus 
coming to town.10 And the crowds roared. The 100 or so pages of 
The Death of Contract generated hundreds of pages of law journal 
book reviews11 and commentary.12 According to Anthony Waters, 
"The Death of Contract quickly became one of those books that every-
body reads and nobody praises. . . . For the better part of ten years, 
the literature has been replete with references to that book, as have 
the conferences, the workshops and the academic small-talk. "13 
Many readers felt, moreover, that the book might be a kind of 
magic act, a put-on, designed for the joy of friendly deceit. In his re-
6 !d. at 96-98. 
7 I d. at 98. Gilmore noted that current tort law was much more expansive than the theory of 
tort from which contract was separated a hundred years ago. !d. at 95. 
8 ld. at 95. 
9 !d. at 96. 
10 Among many reviews were Clare Dalton, Book Review, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 1372 (1975); 
Richard A. Epstein, Book Review, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HrsT. 68 (1976); James R. Gordley, Book 
Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 452 (1975); Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wrs. L. REv . 
1216; Morton J. Horwitz, Book Review, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 787 (1975); Gary Milhollin, More on 
the Death of Contract, 24 CATH. U. L. REv. 29 (1974); S.F.C. Milsom, A Pageant in Modern 
Dress, 84 YALE L.J. 1585 (1975); Ralph J. Mooney, The Rise and Fall of Classical Contract Law, 
55 OR. L. REv. 155 (1976); Charles Reitz, Book Review, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 697 (1975); Richard 
E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 
1161 (1975); Timothy J. Sullivan, Book Review, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 403 (1975); Arthur T. 
VonMehren, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1974); Anthony J. Waters, Book Review, 
36 MD. L. REv. 270 (1976). For a complete listing of reviews of THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT, see 
the Bibliography to GILMORE, supra note 1. 
11 Richard Danzig even wrote a review of the reviews, Richard Danzig, The Death of Con-
tract and the Life of the Profession: Observations on the Intellectual State of Legal Academia, 29 
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1977). 
12 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CrN. L. REv. 1283, 
1289-94 (1990); Robert Hillman, The Crisis in Modem Contract Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 103, 113· 
18 (1988). 
l3 Anthony J. Waters, For Grant Gilmore, 42 Mo. L. REv. 865, 869-70 (1983). 
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view, Richard Speidel wrote, "I confess to an instinctive feeling that 
he [Grant Gilmore] will be amused by all of the reviewers who take 
him so seriously. "14 And Anthony Waters later reported that Grant 
Gilmore said he was "absolutely astonished" by the response to The 
Death of Contract: "All this left Gilmore 'absolutely astonished.' 
Each time he told me so, he used precisely the same phrase. "15 Puz-
zled by Gilmore's rehearsal of this phrase in reference to The Death of 
Contract, Waters mentioned it to him: 
One day I summoned the courage to tell him that not only had he told 
me the same thing before, each time using the same phrase, but that-
and this is what struck me most-he had, more than once, described 
Holmes;s reaction to the reception of The Common Law in the same 
way, using that very same phrase. For: once, I startled him.16 
WhY all the excitement? And why the feeling of being had, of 
being taken in? Was Gilmore posturing? Was he joking on his col-
leagues by suggesting that the law had moved even beyond the sociali-
zation of contract to its dissolution?17 The Death of Contract appears 
to have not only the excitement of a circus but the politics of a "freak" 
show.1s How are we to respond? Are we to celebrate the arrival of a 
new understanding of human connection, or are we to be repelled by 
the sight of "abnormal" human entanglement? Readers have been 
perplexed by the message of The Death of Contract and mislead by its 
vision of contract law. 
A. Contorts Today 
The foretold coming of Contorts has not occurred. It is not true 
today that any detriment reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance 
on a defendant's assurances must be recompensed or that any benefit 
received by a defendant must be paid for unless it was clearly meant 
as a gift. It is more accurate to say that recovery based on reliance is 
more restricted today than it was in 1974 and that the traditional re-
luctance to impose liability for benefit received still dominates unjust 
enrichment doctrine. 
14 Speidel, supra note 10, at 1167. 
15 Waters, supra note 13, at 870. 
16 !d. 
17 Grant Gilmore and Friedrich Kessler used the term "socialization of contract" in their 
highly-regarded casebook to refer to modem contract law. See FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT 
GILMORE, CoNTRAcrs: CASES AND MATERIALS 1118 (2d ed. 1970). The phrase echos Pound's 
"socialization of law." RoscoE PoUND, JuRISPRUDENCE 429-32 (1959) (quoting Jhering that the 
socialization of law reflects the increasing value placed on persons rather than property). 
18 See generally RoBERT BoGAN, FREAK SHow: PRESENTING HuMAN 0DDITfES FOR AMUSE· 
MENT AND PRoFIT (1990); David A. Gerber, Pornography or Entertainment: The Rise and Fall of 
the Freak Show, 18 REv. IN AM. HIST. 15 (1990) (reviewing RoBERT BoGAN, FREAK SHow: 
PRESENTING HuMAN 0DDmEs FOR AMusEMENT AND PRoFIT). 
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First, courts have severely restricted recovery based on promis-
sory estoppel. In New York, for example, in order to prevail on a 
promissory estoppel claim, a plaintiff must establish the following ele-
ments: (1) A clear and unambiguous promise by the defendant, upon 
which there was (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the plain-
tiff, (3) such that the defendant's failure to perform will cause injury 
or, perhaps, "unconscionable" injury.l9 In addition, promissory estop-
pel claims are not permitted in employment situations, or at least not 
in at-will employment situations.20 By my count, New York courts 
have issued only forty-five reported decisions addressing promissory 
estoppel claims, including claims in which promissory estoppel is as-
serted as a defense against enforcement of the statute of frauds; the 
claims were rejected in thirty-nine of the forty-five cases; in only two 
' of the cases, appellate courts upheld judgments granted on the basis of 
promissory estoppel; in tWo others, summary judgments were reversed 
and the cases were remanded for trial on promissory estoppel and 
other claims; and in two cases, no decision was made on the promis-
sory estoppel claims, with the case decided on other grounds.21 
Courts in other jurisdictions have imposed similar restrictions. 
Many courts now limit the doctrine of detrimental reliance to situa-
tions in which there was a "clear and unambiguous" or a "clear and 
definite" promise upon which the reliance was placed.22 This restric-
tion has developed in the years since The Death of Contract was pub-
lished. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. ,23 a case widely cited for its 
enforcement of Red Owl's "assurances" upon which the Hoffmans 
had relied, has been narrowly interpreted or simply rejected.24 Simi-
19 See, e.g., Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Tutak v. Thtak, 758, 507 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1986); Ripples's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assoc., 
452 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (1982). 
20 See, e.g., Van Brunt v. Rauschenberg, 799 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Dalton v. Union 
Bank of Switzerland, 520 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (1987). 
21 Phuong Pham reports a similar tally for the years after 1981. See Phuong N. Pham, The 
Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1263 (1994). 
22 See, e.g., Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1985); Hass v. Darigold Dairy 
Prods. Co., 751 F.2d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1985); Jungmann v. St. Regis Pape r Co., 682 F.2d 195 
(8th Cir. 1982); Ernest Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1976); Vincent DiVito, Inc. v. Vollmar Clay Prod. Co., 534 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). But 
see Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 457 N. W.2d 793 (Neb. 1990) (rejecting special "definiteness" require· 
ment for promissory estoppel). See generally Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond 
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, " 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 
(1985); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent· Based Liilbility Emerging Under the Guise 
of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 895 (1987); Edward 
Yorio & Steve The!, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991 ). 
23 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
24 See, e.g., Major Mat v. Monsanto Co., 969 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Hoff-
man to require proof that "the promise was one that the promisor reasonably should have ex-
pected would induce action or forbearance" and deciding that the statement "you can rest 
assured we will have an unending supply of remnants" made by an artificial turf supplier did not 
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larly, several jurisdictions have limited the application of promissory 
estoppel in employment contexts and in landlord-tenant trans-
actions.25 The idea that it is unreasonable to rely on a promise of 
one's employer or one's landlord clearly is not consistent with Gil-
more's vision of Contorts and the protection of reliance and interde-
pendence. This categorical denial is particularly troubling in cases 
where there are numerous other reasons, including ties of friendship 
and reciprocity, to justify the reliance.26 
The doctrine of promise for benefit received also has not fulfilled 
Gilmore's predictions. Gilmore argued that unjust enrichment pro-
vides an "even more compelling case for protection" than promissory 
estoppe~ and thus represents a significant blurring of the boundary 
between contract, tort, and other bases of liability.27 It is true that the 
set o_f values associated with unjust enrichment, or restitution, has 
powerful appeal; but as Gilmore acknowledged, the law of restitution 
coexisted with classical contract theory in cases such as Cotnam v. 
Wisdom28 and Britton v. Tumer.29 The mere relaxation of rules 
against recovery in restitution for a person who has breached her con-
tract is hardly a major change in contract thinking. As Gilmore sug-
gested, the more significant contest between unjust enrichment and 
contract is posed by the doctrine allowing enforcement of a promise 
made in recognition of a past benefit, incorporated in Section 86 of 
meet this requirement); State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N. W.2d 104, 109 (Mich. 1993) 
(rejecting Hoffman in favor of a rule requiring that the promise be "clear and definite"). 
25 See, e.g., Dickens v. Quincy College Corp., 615 N.E.2d 381, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("a too 
liberal application of promissory estoppel to employment situations can cause a significant im-
pact on the concept of employment at will"); see also Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456 (7th 
Cir. 1986) ("[E]mployment at will . .. remains the dominant type of employment relationship in 
this country and would be seriously undermined if employees could use the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel. ... Reliance is easily, perhaps too easily, shown in the employment context."). 
But is not the prevalence of reliance in employment relationships a reason to enforce promises 
rather than a reason not to enforce them? 
26 In Van Brunt v. Rauscbenberg, 799 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), for example, the plain-
tiff, William Van Brunt, had been a close personal friend of the defendant, the artist Robert 
Rauschenberg. Van Brunt alleged that Rauschenberg breached his promises to pay Van Brunt's 
living and business expenses and to give him various pieces of artwork from exhibits that the two 
had worked on together in exchange for Van Brunt's work in coordinating exhibitions and on 
other artistic and administrative projects. /d. at 1470. Van Brunt alleged breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel, among other claims. Id. Although the court allowed Van Brunt to tile a 
new complaint alleging specific breach of contract claims, it would not allow the promissory 
estoppel claim because the relationship between the two men was an "employment" relation-
ship: "While Van Brunt has alleged each element of promissory estoppel (including a clear and 
unambiguous promise and reasonable and foreseeable reliance], the claim is nevertheless dis-
missed. This is because New York does not recognize promissory estoppel as a valid cause of 
action when raised in the employment context." /d. 
27 GilMORE, supra note 1, at 80. 
28 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907). 
29 6 N.H. 481 (1834). 
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the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.30 Gilmore noted that this pro-
vision is "[a] hesitant and cautious text ... [that] no doubt reflects the 
uncertainties of the Reporter and his advisers."31 He urged, neverthe-
less, that "[t]he principal thing is that Restatement (Second) gives overt 
recognition to an important principle whose existence Restatement 
(First) ignored and, by implication denied."32 He predicted, more-
over, that this principle would grow in significance: "By the time we 
get to Restatement (Third) it may well be that ... § [86] will have 
flowered like Jack's bean-stalk in the same way that § 90 did between 
Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second)."33 
This prediction has not proved true. Very few reported decisions 
1 since 1974 have even mentioned Section 86, and most of those refer-
ences have been made on~y in passing, often in reference to contract 
actions barred by the statute of limitations. I have found only four 
reported decisions involving Section 86; in two, the courts found that 
Section 86 would not support enforcement of the promise. Moreover, 
the two cases holding that Section 86 might support enforcement of 
the promise involve situations that fit a traditional quasi-contract 
model-one involved service rendered by a broker and another care 
provided by a sister. These cases do not represent movement toward 
the idea that "to prevent unjust enrichment, any benefit received by a 
defendant must be paid for unless it was clearly meant as a gift" as 
Gilmore suggested.34 
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CoNTRACTS § 86 (Promise for Benefit Received): 
(1) A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from 
the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice. 
(2) A promise is not binding under Subsection (1) 
(a) if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the promisor has 
not been unjustly enriched; or 
(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit. 
Gilmore's discussion refers to § 89A of the Tentative Draft, No.2 (1965), the wording of which 
was identical to the final § 86. See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 132 n.163; RESTATEMENT (SEC· 
OND) OF CONTRACTS§ 89A (Tentative Draft No.2, 1965). 
31 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 81-82. 
32 Id. at 84. 
33 !d. 
34 See Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'! Bank of Ariz., 738 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. a. App. 1986) 
(finding that broker may recover on promise to pay for past services); McMurry v. Magnusson, 
849 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the jury should have been allowed to consider 
past services in connection with enforcement of an express promise to pay); cf. First Nat '! Bank-
shares v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that rule of§ 86 does not apply to a 
promise to pay more than required by a prior contract); Starr v. Katz, 1994 WL 548209 (D.N.J. 
1994) (concluding that litigant failed to provide sufficient evidence of past benefit or argument 
under § 86); G uaranty Bank v. National Surety Corp., 508 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) 
(holding that past consideration rule does not apply where the past benefit was part of another 
agreement). 
In two recent articles, Professors Steve The! and Edward Yorio have argued that most 
courts have treated promissory estoppel and past consideration doctrines as promise-based. In 
the most recent they observe: 
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Following some initial expansion, many courts have domesticated 
the doctrines of promissory estoppel and promise for benefit received, 
making them compatible with classical contract theory, or at least 
much less of a threat to it.35 Most current versions of these doctrines 
offer little threat to the idea that no one should be liable for anything, 
at least not anything that she or he has not explicitly agreed to do. It 
seems that the pressures of contract ideology are so strong that, over 
time, they have reshaped the rebellious versions of these doctrines, 
fitting them into line with contract ideology. That means that lawyers 
and others troubled by the limitations and abuses of classical contract 
theocy must have periodic bursts of new ideas. For this, we need gen-
erative theories. . 
. The Death of Contract does not discuss the implied obligation of 
good faith or the doctrine of unconscionability, perhaps because these 
doctrines do not directly challenge the bargained-for consideration re-
quirement of classical contract law. Yet they do suggest a basis for 
obligation between people other than narrowly interpreted promise or 
consent, and these doctrines often are cited as evidence of the coming 
together of contract and tort, as a part of Contorts. Their fate has 
been very similar to promissory estoppel and promise for benefit re-
ceived. Most courts limit the doctrine of unconscionability so as to 
apply only to the time of formation of the contract, require that the 
contract be significantly more burdensome than other contracts of 
that sort, and require some evidence of procedural unfairness in the 
bargaining process.36 The Uniform Commercial Code's suggestion 
that this doctrine foster analysis of "oppression" in contracting rela-
Professor Grant Gilmore used Section 90 and the moral obligation cases as paradigms for 
his theory, presented in The Death of ContTact, that contract law is being absorbed into a 
general theory of civil liability based primarily on tort-related concepts. In contrast, we 
argued in our earlier article that Section 90 promises are enforced even if the promisee does 
not suffer detrimental reliance. This finding supports the conclusion that in such cases 
courts enforce well-considered promises, rather than compensate for harm. Similarly, in 
this Article we argue that when courts enforce promises based on felt moral obligation, they 
are not compensating the promisee for harm that she would otherwise suffer, but instead are 
enforcing the serious commitments of promissors. The power of promise in this context 
shows that contract remains a vital theory of obligation distinct from the tort concept of 
compensation for harm. 
Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REv. 1045, 
1052 (1992) (citations omitted). See also Thel & Yorio, supra note 22. 
35 I do not mean to suggest that promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment could never be a 
threat to individualist contract ideology; broad versions of these doctrines clearly have chal-
lenged contract thinking and continue to do so. Cf Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The 
Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 
OHio ST. L.J. 153, 215 (1995) ("Promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, broadly applied, 
could be quite subversive of an employer's power to control its employee benefit obligations"). 
36 See generally V.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 208; E. AL!..AN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 323-39 (2d ed. 1990). But see Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362, 1366-67 
(Haw. 1988) (unconscionability applied to the time of performance of a pre-marital agreement). 
139 
I 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
tionships has been largely ignored.37 Similarly, many courts have in-
terpreted the doctrine of good faith narrowly; some have limited its 
application to contracts involving "special relationships"38 and some 
have interpreted it to mean little more than honesty in fact and an 
absence of malice in the performance of contracts.39 
So what is the law of Contorts today? Here is a general 
framework:4o 
1) In order to evoke the doctrines of promissory estoppel and promise 
for benefit received, it is necessary to prove that the defendant explicitly 
undertook the obligation. In addition, promissory estoppel often re-
quires proof that the undertaking was made by a "clear and definite" or 
"clear and unambiguous" promise and that the promisor was not an em-
ployer, a landlord, or others in positions of power. 
2) Under the doctrine of unconscionability, a contract cannot be more 
burdensome than most contracts of the same sort, judged at the time of 
the contract, unless the burdened party actually agreed to that arrange-
ment or the arrangement was conspicuously described in a contract doc-
ument. Generally, the doctrine of unconscionability will require more 
disclosure and greater fairness in relationships that are reciprocal and 
long-lasting, between people with roughly equal status, because courts 
will assume that parties in such relationships expect such behavior. 
3) If the contract is long-lasting, or involves a relationship of trust, the 
parties generally owe an obligation of good faith to each other, which 
means some obligation of cooperation and the avoidance of opportu-
nism. Generally, however, the obligation of good faith is not violated if 
a contract document allows the behavior in question. Many jurisdictions 
hold that at-will employment relationships do not include obligations of 
good faith, despite other evidence of trust or evidence that the employ-
ment has been or is expected to be long-lasting. In each of these areas, 
courts tend to equate obligation and reasonable expectation, and they 
tend to find expectations reasonable when the relationship is between 
people with relatively equal political and social status. This makes sense 
inasmuch as political and social status operates as a kind of social grid, 
37 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 ("The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair 
surprise"). In early commentary drafts, Llewellyn developed the notion of unfair surprise as 
critical to unconscionability. See, e.g., Introductory Comments to Parts II and III, Formation and 
Construction 16-17 (1944), in THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS J.VI.2.h (unpublished collection, 
available at the University of Chicago Law School Library). He was enthusiastic about this 
doctrine. See WILUAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND TiiE REALIST MoVEMENT 291 (1973); 
cf Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REv. 485 (1967) (asserting that Llewellyn was uneasy about § 2-302). 
38 See, e.g., Arnold v. Nat'l County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987). 
39 See, e.g., Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1989); see also U.C.C. 
§ 1-203. 
40 Since each of these boundaries is contested, of course there are cases holding differently 
than this general map suggests. And the recognition of such "rebellious decisions" is crucial to 
contract law and theory. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. The purpose of the 
boxed chart is merely to highlight a general framework into which these doctrines, and many 
cases decided under them, fall . 
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defining with whom one identifies and toward whom one feels sympathy 
and trust. 
These doctrines form a sort of blueprint, a map of contractual 
obligation beyond the paradigmatic explicit exchange of promises; in 
box form, it looks like this: 
LONG-LASTING DISCRETE ExCHANGES 
RELATIONSHIPS 
PEoPLE WHO E.g. , partnerships, joint- E.g., one-time purchases 
IDENTIFY ventures or services 
WITK EACH - reliance protected 
- reliance protected if sig-
OTHER BY - disclosure required nificant and foreseeable 
~AU ETC. - implied obligations of - disclosure requirements 
- good faith, cooperation, often set by trade or 
best efforts, and the like community practice 
- some implied obliga-
tions of good faith 
PEoPLE WHO E.g., employment, tenancy E.g., cross-class, cross-
DO NOT - reliance viewed as cultural, and cross-racial 
IDENTIFY unreasonable or unpro- sales, sales in poor areas 
WITH EACH tected or neighborhoods of color 
OTHER 
- disclosure required only - reliance viewed as 
to avoid deception unreasonable or 
- no meaningful implied unprotected 
obligations of good faith - disclosure required only 
to avoid deception 
- no meaningful implied 
obligations of good faith 
The length of connection between individual parties does influ-
ence the content of obligations and expectations between them, as re-
lational contract theory suggests.41 However, the degree of social 
identification or alienation apart from the contract affects the content 
of obligations and expectations even more significantly. As this chart 
suggests, social positioning is more significant to the content of expec-
tations and obligations between people than length of relationship. 
This chart accurately reflects contracting practice in the late twentieth-
century United States, in which relationships between people who 
identify and otherwise sympathize with each other through social posi-
tioning of class, race, and gender are often characterized by flexibility, 
cooperation, and norms of fairness, while relationships between peo-
ple of different social power and position, who do not identify or sym-
pathize with each other, are often exploitative and marked by the 
powerful party's disregard for the other. The wages of agricultural, 
homework, and non-unionized office and factory workers, for exam-
41 See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
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ple, are too low to support a healthy life and are a small fraction of 
salaries paid to corporate executives: some corporate officers in the 
United States are paid in a range of 3000 to 30,000 times the income of 
other employees.42 As a result, the United States has the greatest ine-
quality in wealth and income of all industrialized nations. 43 Excessive 
rents charged for apartments in low income areas, infiated prices 
charged by outside merchants doing business in neighborhoods of 
color, poor quality of medical and other services rendered to the 
poor44-these are instances of disregard, indifference, and exploita-
tion by more powerful contracting parties. These contracts do not in-
clude expectations of reliance, reciprocity, good faith, or mutual 
concern. Social alienation precludes human connection. This pattern 
1 may be predictable in a society like ours, with our long history of 
domination of some groups by others through systems of race, sex, 
and class hierarchy, but surely it is cause for concern. 
And this concern is not about the death of contract. In all of this, 
contract flourishes. Our concern is rather with justice, with the ways 
that contract can accompany oppression. How could Gilmore have 
thought that contract was dead? The answer, I think, is that Gilmore's 
analysis of contract gets lost in nostalgia and in the complicated poli-
tics of blasphemy. Although critical of the selfishness of Holmes's in-
dividualism, Gilmore also expresses nostalgia for an imagined past 
where individual freedom flourished. In the blasphemy of declaring 
contract dead, Gilmore invites his readers to embrace the value of 
contractual freedom without the need for further analysis. Moreover, 
by portraying contract as life-threatened, The Death of Contract con-
ceals and therefore fails to analyze the persistence and politics of con-
tract ideology. By feigning endorsement of a new human 
connectedness, the book argues for political and legal reactionism. 
42 See John A. Byrne, That Eye·Popping Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 25, 1994, at 88 ( re-
porting the 1993 income of $205,010,590 for Disney Chief Executive Officer Michael D. E isner); 
Andrea Gerlin, Spread of Illegal Home Sewing is Fueled by Immigrants, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 15, 
1994, at B1 (noting that the Dallas-Fort Worth home-sewing industry has a full-time work force 
estimated at between 20,000 and 80,000 workers who are paid as little as 15 to 25 cents a piece, 
earning approximately $7000 a year); Pam Ginsbach, Minimum Wage: Latest BLS Data Shows 
4.1 Million Workers at or Below Minimum Wage, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 13, 1995, at 48 (4.1 
million workers in U.S. are paid at or below minimum hourly wage of $4.25). 
43 See Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
1995, at Al (noting that the inequality of wealth and income in the U.S. is the greatest of all 
industrialized nations). 
44 See Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to 
Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147 [hereinafter Austin, A Nation of Thieves) (citing 
numerous studies); Ian Ayers, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Nego-
tiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1991 ); Marie G reen, How Minorities Are Sold Short, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 1990, at A21; Kenneth Howe & Yumi Wilson, Poverty Carries a High Price: 
Report reveals that poor pay more for goods and services, S.F. CHRoN., Oct. 6, 1993, at Bl. 
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B. Gilmore's Analysis: Blasphemy and the Reaffirmation 
of Contract 
To explain "what contract .. . was about in the first place and ... 
what caused the fatal disease," Gilmore points first to the political, 
economic, and intellectual circumstances of the late nineteenth cen-
tury~ Suggesting a historical explanation for contract theory, he em-
phasizes the close resemblance between classical contract and laissez-
faire economic theories: 
In both models, ... "parties could be treated as individual economic . 
units which, in theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of deci-
sion." 1 suppose that laissez-faire economic theory comes down to 
somethlhg like this: If we all do exactly as we please, no doubt every-
thing will work out for the best. Which does seem to be about the same 
thit;lg that the contract tneory comes down to ... [T]he lawyers and the 
economists, both responding to the same stimuli, produced theoretical 
systems which were harmonious with each other and which, in both 
cases, evidently responded to the felt needs of the time.45 
Next, Gilmore argues that changes in political and economic life dur-
ing the twentieth century have affected people's views of both 
theories: · 
It seems apparent to the twentieth century mind, as perhaps it did not to 
the nineteenth century mind, that a system in which everybody is invited to 
do his own thing, at whatever cost to his neighbor, must work ultimately to 
the benefit of the rich and powerful, who are in a position to look after 
themselves and to act, so to say, as their own self-insurers. As we look 
back on the nineteenth century theories, we are struck most of all , I 
think, by the narrow scope of social duty which they implicitly assumed. 
No man is his brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take 
the hindmost. For good or ill, we have changed all that. We are now all 
cogs in a machine, each dependent on the other. The decline and fall of 
the general theory of contract and, in most quarters, of Jaissez-faire eco-
nomics may be taken as remote reflections of the transition from nine-
teenth century individualism to the welfare state and beyond.46 
45 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 103-04. A footnote to this passage notes that al though Posner 
referred to the account of a connection between nineteenth-century restrictions on tort liability 
and nineteenth-century economic theories as "orthodox," this account was "novel" when ex-
pressed by Lawrence Friedman in 1965. Gilmore concedes, however, that the connection was 
becoming "commonplace" by the early 1970s. 
46 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 104 (emphasis added). In addition, Gilmore offers some "more 
specifically legal" factors in the shape of contract theory and in its declining "hold on the legal 
imagination": first, the goal of national uniformity in the substantive law, which required "an 
intensive purification of doctrine ... the one true rule of law, universal and unchanging, always 
and everywhere the same" ... "(t]o all of us, I dare say, the idea seems absurd. We are steeped in 
the idea that law is process, flux, change; our relativism admits no absolutes." But, "for a riot of 
pure doctrine, nothing could have been better than Contract. ·since there had never been a 
general theory of contract before, there was nothing to inhibit the free play of the creative imagi-
nation." /d. at 104-07. A second factor was "an uneasy, inarticulate distrust of the role and 
function of the civil jury," id. at 108,-"avoidance of fact questions wherever possible as well as 
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This explanation of the life and death of contract is striking. First, 
it suggests that the mere perception that classical contract theory ben-
efits the "rich and powerful" would undermine the influence of that 
theory. If this assumption were true, surely struggles for racial, gen-
der, and class justice would not have been as difficult and bloody as 
they have been and continue to be, for racism, sexism, and class 
domination also benefit the rich and powerful. Surely Gilmore did 
not mean that merely seeing how contract theory benefits the rich and 
powerful is enough to dissuade modern minds. 
Instead, his analysis rests on the purported changes in social and 
material circumstances: the shift from "nineteenth century individual-
ism to the welfare state and beyond."47 We are disenchanted with 
contract, he suggests, because we no longer live as individualists. Yet 
this explanation portrays interdependence, which Gilmore claims as 
the reality of modern life, in a very unattractive image: "For good or 
ill . . . [ w ]e are now all cogs in a machine. " 48 Picture yourself as a 
"cog" in some machine-are you smiling? Picture Gilmore- is he? 
How are we to read this image? And what of the provocative remark, 
"[f]or good or ill,"49 so casually thrown out? 
By portraying life without contract as the life of a "cog," Gilmore 
encourages the reader to reclaim individualism and to view its alterna-
tive as inhuman and unnatural. Professor Donna Haraway observes 
that "blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seri-
ously ... . Blasphemy is not apostasy."50 Gilmore's blasphemy in The 
Death of Contract requires taking "freedom of contract" and "individ-
ual autonomy"-the values proclaimed by classical contract theory-
very seriously. Unfortunately, though, Gilmore does not use his blas-
phemy as a creative force. Instead, as in the passage just quoted, the 
image of life as a cog overshadows Gilmore's critique of contract. 
This image of life without contract is horrific. With this image, Gil-
more affirms individualistic contract as normal and humane and shifts 
the readers ' attention from the shortcomings of contract to the neces-
sity of its preservation. In this shift, the power of Gilmore's critique of 
the restatement of questions of fact as questions of Jaw through such devices as the reformulated 
doctrine of consideration and the newly minted objective theory of contract. " !d. at 107. Now, 
"the civil jury is on its way out. ... Since we no longer have to worry much about juries, we need 
no longer be as reluctant as once we were to allow trial courts- as triers of the facts - to inquire 
into such essentially factual questions as good faith , reasonableness, observance of commercial 
standards, change of circumstance, or, for that matter, fraud, duress and coercion." !d. at 109. 
47 ld. at 104. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. 
50 Donna J . Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist·Feminism in 
the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND W OMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 
149 (1991) (originally published as A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Femi-
nism in the 80s, 80 SOCIAU ST 65 (1985)). 
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contract is lost. Having set up the opposition between contract as 
freedom and not-contract as cog-dom, Gilmore leaves no room for 
discussion of just and unjust contracting practices or alternative ver-
sions of contract theory. The only possibilities become contract as 
normal and free or not-contract as unnatural and confined. This is the 
politics of the "freak" show. 
Although Gilmore argues for expansion of liability based on reli-
ance and unjust enrichment, his arguments shock more than they per-
suade. And to shock with the unusual is to reaffirm the usual. This 
also is the ¢olitics of the "freak" show. If bearded ladies are exhibited 
as "freaks," then hairlessness will be seen not merely as common, but 
also as_ a mark of adequacy.51 Without analysis of the persistence of 
contraCt ideology and with the tone of adoring blasphemy, The Death 
of Contract asserts the inevitability and thus the desirability of individ-
ualistic contract thinking, all the while abdicating responsibility for its 
consequences. Gilmore's account of the "death of contract" as the 
"death of freedom" is at once enthusiastic and resigned, even resent-
ful. While some have seen Gilmore's announcement of the death of 
contract as wishful thinking,52 this passage makes it appear much 
more like overreaction.53 
II. CONTRACT THEORIES, A C ONYE RS A TION 
On one level, Gilmore's was a category failure . Because The 
Death of Contract equates "contract" with "classical contract theory," 
thought about human obligation that is inconsistent with classical con-
tract theory must, by definition, be not-contract.54 One common re-
sponse to The Death of Contract has been to say that contract should 
be defined more broadly, as those obligations that arise as a conse-
quence of choice or consent, which would include promises relied 
51 Thousands of women in the United States. disciplined by the rule of normalcy, do spend 
much time, money, and emotional energy concealing their facial hair. See T AMI GoLD, JuG-
GUNG GENDER (Videotape 1992) (available from Women Make Movies, Inc., New York, N.Y.) 
(portrait of Jennifer Miller, a bearded woman). 
52 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 10, at 1166-67 (describing Gilmo re's predictions as "gleeful " 
and o bserving that " (i)t is clear to me, at least, that Gilmore hopes the course for the future is to 
develop new synthesis rather than to attempt a reformulation of the law of contract along classi-
cal lines"). 
53 The Death of Contract is, in this way, reminiscent of PATRJCK S. ATfYAH, THE RtsE AND 
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRACT (1979). See Elizabeth Mensch, Freedom of Contracc as Ideol-
ogy, 33 STAN. L. Rev. 753, 767-72 (1981) (describing The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Concract as 
limited by Professo r Atiyah's "nostalgia fo r the myth of past economic freedoms ... and his 
identification with history's educated elite"). 
54 For an extended analysis of classification issues, see Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of 
Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1989). Professor Feinman o bserves that the critical reac-
tion to The Death of Contract "became a focal point for examining the nature of contract law 
and the p rocess of doctrinal classification." !d. at 669. 
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upon and promises made in recognition of a past benefit.55 This 
observation leads to the conclusion that The Death of Contract over-
emphasized the significance of the decline of bargained-for considera-
tion. In addition, Gilmore's slippage from alternatives to bargained-
for consideration (promissory estoppel and Section 86) to alternatives 
to choice or consent (cog-like) reveals both his failure to analyze the 
persistence of choice, consent, and individual autonomy as values 
among us and his failure to question the perceived correspondence 
between free market capitalism and freedom. 
Philosopher Virginia Held writes of the pervasiveness of these 
1 ideas, which I will call contract ideology or "contract thinking." 
Although a distinction between ideology and theory would be mis-
leading in many contexts, I will maintain a distinction here in order to 
separate ideology as a broad set of culturally located thoughts about 
and perceptions of humari relations and theory as specific academic or 
legal projects that seek to understand, justify, or reorder thought and 
practice. Professor Held observes: 
Contemporary society is in the grips of contractual thinking. Realities 
are interpreted in contractual terms, and goals are formulated in terms 
of rational contracts. The leading current conceptions of rationality be-
gin with the assumptions that human beings are independent, self-inter-
ested or mutually disinterested, individuals; they then typically argue 
that it is often rational for human beings to enter into contractual rela-
tionships with each other.56 
Held argues that contract ideology is both descriptive and normative. 
People in contemporary society tend to see human relationships, both 
between individuals and among groups, in contractual terms. We 
learn to think of human society as based in contract: assumptions 
rooted in contract ideology "underlie the principles upon which most 
persons in contemporary Western society claim their most powerful 
institutions to be founded. "57 In the United States, "[w]e are told that 
modern democratic states rest on a social contract, that their econo-
mies should be thought of as a free market where producers and con-
sumers, employers and employees make contractual agreements. And 
we should even, it is suggested, interpret our culture as a free market 
of ideas. "58 
On the prescriptive side, "leading theories of justice and equality 
such as those of Rawls, Noziak, and Dworkin, suggest what social ar-
rangements should be like to more fully reflect the requirements of 
contractual rationality." On an individual level, "[t]he vast domain of 
55 See, e.g. , Speidel, supra note 10, at 1178-82. 
56 Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, 13 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 111, 111-
12 (Supp. 1987). 
57 !d. at 112. 
58 !d. 
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rational choice theory, supposedly applicable to the whole range of 
human activity and experience, makes the same basic assumptions 
about individuals, contractual relations, and rationality," and 
prescribes human behavior that maximizes contractual freedom. In 
Held's view, the range of contract thinking is increasing, not decreas-
ing: "contractual solutions are increasingly suggested for problems 
which arise in areas not hitherto thought of in contractual terms, such 
as in dealing with unruly patients in treatment contexts, in controlling 
inmates in prisons, and even in bringing up children."59 
rofes~or Lawrence Friedman, upon whose work Grant Gilmore 
drew in expfaining the decline of classical contract theory,6o disagrees 
with Gilmore and other death-of-contract theorists, specifically Pat-
rick Atiyah, about the decline in contract values: "One could argue 
the very opposite case: that is, the 'values involved in individual free-
dom of choice' have gotten more robust over the years."61 In The 
Republic of Choice, Friedman argues that social and legal culture in 
the United States is rooted in the valuing of individual choice and that 
"the essence of contract is choice; contract means free and voluntary 
movements and arrangements, so that a social order based on contract 
is a social order which exalts the individual and his options above all 
else, a regime in which individual choice is the measure and Iegiti-
mator of all things. "62 Friedman argues that it is a mistake to view 
government regulation and social support systems as a decline in con-
tract thinking: "The problem arises if we equate business regulation 
or the apparatus of the welfare state with restrictions on choice. Reg-
ulations in one sense do restrict choice, but some of the innovations 
and restrictions have ... quite the opposite feel." 63 Over all, Fried-
man concludes, "the classic ideas have retained enormous power."64 
Regardless of its origins, contract ideology persists in the law in 
large par! because it has a pervasive and persistent hold on the imagi-
nations of many, particularly those professionals who most strongly 
influence public and legal discourse.65 It involves, as Friedman de-
scribes, a cluster of widely and strongly held political and ethical val-
ues. And it includes, as Virginia Held observes, an epistemological 
aspect: contract ideology supplies the terms in and through which 
many perceive social reality. Professor William Klein demonstrated 
59 /d. at 112-13. 
60 GrLMORE, supra note 1, at 6-8. 
61 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 
80-82 (1990). 
62 /d. at 81. 
63 /d. 
64 /d. at 47. 
65 See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 433, 436 
(1993) ("contract images and ideology exert a strong hold on the legal imaginations of the 
Justices"). 
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the epistemological essence of contract ideology when he candidly 
remarked (in response to a discussion of alternative models for cor-
porate organization): "I tend to think of all modem-day relationships, 
at least in a free society such as ours, in bargain terms."66 The unex-
amined "tendency" to think of human relationships in contract terms 
is a central part of contract ideology. 
Virginia Held deplores the persistence of contract ideology, argu-
ing that ·it includes misleading assumptions about current social 
arrangements: 
As descriptions of reality [the assumptions of contract ideology] can be 
highly misleading. Actual societies are the results of war, exploitation, 
racism, and patriarchy far more than of social contracts. Economic and 
political realities are the outcomes of political strength triumphing over 
economic weakness more than of a free market. And rather than a free 
market of ideas, we have a culture in which the loudspeakers that are the 
mass media drown out the soft voices of free expression.67 
Moreover, "[a]s expressions ofnormative concern ... contractual the-
ories hold out an impoverished view of human aspiration,"68 and they 
are seriously incomplete: "[cJontractual society is society perpetually 
in danger of breaking down."69 Contractual relations are not suffi-
cient to maintain social life: "what are needed for even adequate 
levels of social cohesion are persons tied together by relations of con-
cern and caring and empathy and trust rather than merely by contracts 
it may be in their interests to disregard."70 The system of contract 
itself depends upon other kinds of human connection: "[a]ny enforce-
ment mechanisms put in place to keep persons to their contracts will 
be as subject to disintegration as the contracts themselves; at some 
point contracts must be embedded in social relations that are non-
contractual. "71 
66 WiUiam A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 n.15 (1982) (questioning business association theories that use concepts of 
role and status, such as JAMES S. CoLEMAN, PoWER AND THE STRucruRE OF SociETY 13-31 
(1974)). Under this totalizing view, even government regulation and "the apparatus of the wel-
fare state" are made compatible with a regime of contract. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61 , at 81. 
67 Held, supra note 46, at 113. 
68 !d. 
69 !d. at 124-25. 
70 !d. at 125. 
71 !d. Held's view, which is shared by scholars such as Carole Pateman, Annette Baier, and 
Carol Rose, is that the social bonds of exchange among self-interested individuals are inherently 
unstable. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CoNTRAcr (1988) (arguing that social contract 
theorists have assumed women's subordination as a necessary part of social order); Annette 
Baier, Trust and Anti-Trust, 96 Ennes 231, 241 (1986) ("it takes an adult to be able to make a 
contract, and it takes something like Hegel's civil society of near equals to find a use for con-
tracts"); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become 
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REv. 295 (1992) (arguing that ex-
change depends upon trust). 
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Friedman, in contrast, defends contract ideology and the cluster 
of values associated with it as supportive of individual freedom and 
growth, nurturing human agency and excellence: "Despite vast 
changes in the world, the classic ideas [of choice, consent, and con-
tract] have retained enormous power .. .. Choice and its passive form, 
consent, remain part of the inner definition of freedom, the subjective 
definition; they describe what it means to be a responsible human 
being."72 
Among the most ardent defenders of contract ideology is Profes-
sor Ran<:f.y Barnett, c~i~f proponent of one version of neoclassical con-
tract tht!ory.73 In VIVId metaphor, Barnett argues that contract is 
crucial to human survival: 
Su_ppose you are on a commercial airplane that is flying at 35,000 feet. 
Next to you sits a man who appears to be sleeping. In fact, this man has 
been drugged and put upon the plane without his knowledge or consent. 
He has never flown on a plane before and, indeed, has no idea what an 
airplane is. Suddenly the man awakes and looks around him. Terrified 
by the alien environment in which he finds himself, he searches for a 
door or window from which to make an escape. As luck would have it, 
he is seated right next to a window exit and he begins to pull the handle 
that will open the window.1 You are aware that opening the window exit 
at this altitude will cause the cabin to quickly depressurize and that this 
man, you, and probably several other passengers will be sucked out the 
window to your deaths. You desperately want to stop him from opening 
the window. Now assume that for some reason it is impossible to pre-
vent him physically from performing the deadly act. Your only option is 
to rationally persuade him to leave the window exit alone. You cry out 
to him and, with both hands on the handles, he turns to face you and 
waits to hear what you have to say. What sort of argument would you 
make?74 
With this scene of urgency set, Barnett undertakes a functional 
defense of freedom of contract, first defining two components of free-
dom of contract-freedom to contract and freedom from contract-
and then arguing that each of these components addresses important 
social problems of knowledge, interest, and power. Before reading a 
summary of Barnett's arguments, however, you may want to know, as 
I did, who was the poor soul in the airplane, the drugged and un-
worldly one? The feeling of waking up terrified in an alien environ-
ment is one to which I could relate, but I wondered who Barnett had 
72 FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 80. 
73 See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 269 
(1986). 
7 4 Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. 
PHir.. & PoL'Y 62 (1992). 
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in rnind.75 As best I can discern, the poor soul represents "critics" of 
freedom of contract and private property.76 You also may be inter-
ested to read Barnett's footnote 1, which notes that actually it is not 
possible to open an airplane window.77 Considering the intransigence 
of systems of power in the United States and the enormous success of 
scapegoat strategies in maintaining those systems of power, footnote 1 
is revealing.78 By telling this story, Barnett at once targets critics of 
contract as unworldly, perhaps intoxicated, assailants of social life and 
reveals himself as setting up a false enemy with imaginary powers. It 
would be horrible indeed to be sucked out of an airplane window, but 
if Barnett knows this cannot happen, then why does he sound the 
alarm? 
f Barnett's argument, in brief, is that freedom to contract addresses 
tne social problem of limited knowledge by permitting individual 
property holders to discern opportunities for improved allocations of 
resources in the form of profitable exchanges (because the owner her-
self can decide whether or not to sell, for example). Freedom from 
contract, Barnett contends, addresses the problem of limited knowl-
edge by protecting owners' ability to make and carry out knowledge-
able plans without fear of losing control of their resources (an owner 
can undertake a five-year improvement plan, for example, knowing 
that she will not be forced to sell the property before five years). In 
addition, freedom from contract enables market pricing as a system of 
information transmittal (which would be undermined by a system of 
price controls, for example). Restrictions on private property and 
freedom of contract will leave us without means to solve these 
problems of human coordination and thus will undermine human soci-
ety. In as much as welfare systems entail restrictions on private pro-
perty and freedom from contract, we need to do away with the safety 
net in order to prevent all of us from falling out of airplanes. This 
75 See Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-education: An Outsider's Guide, 45 VT. L. REv. 139 
(1990); cf. WoRKING-CLASS WOMEN IN THE ACADEMY: LABORERS IN THE KNOWLEDGE FAC-
TORY (Michelle M. Tokarczyk & Elizabeth A. Fay eds., 1993). 
76 See Barnett, supra note 67, at 94. 
77 "Although the pressurized cabin and the design of airplane exits would make this impossi-
ble, assume that he can open the window exit." !d. at 62 n.l. 
78 The image is especially jarring when one recalls several airplane accidents during govern-
ment deregulation of the airline industry by the Reagan-Bush Administrations, a consequence of 
policy inspired by freedom of contract arguments like Barnett 's. One of these occurred on April 
28, 1988. Clarabelle Lansing, a flight attendant for Aloha Airlines, was killed when the top 
panel of the airplane in which she was working broke off and she was pulled from the plane by 
the depressurizing burst. The poor condition of the airplane was blamed in part on deregulation 
and reduced enforcement of safety standards in the airplane industry during the Reagan-Bush 
Administration. This is hardly an argument for "freedom of contract" between airlines and their 
employees and passengers. See Steven Radwell, U.S. Jetliner Incidents Renew Safety Debme, 
REUTERS, Dec. 28, 1988; Stephen Koepp, Special Report: Aircraft Safety; How Safe Is The U.S. 
Fleet?, TIME, May 16, 1988, at 62. 
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absurd conclusion flows from a dubious assumption in neoclassical 
contract theory, the same assumption that Gilmore criticized in classi-
cal contract theory: that individuals are atomistic, unconnected except 
by bargain relationships, and therefore at risk of social dissolution in 
the ways Barnett suggests. 
A gentler version of contract ideology is given by relational con-
tract theorists. Beginning with an assumption of social connection, re-
lational theorists are unconcerned with the risk of social dissolution 
that Barnett sees as central. Professor Ian Macneil describes contract 
as grounde,d in society: 
Contract"<vithout the common needs and tastes created only by society is 
inconceivable; contract between totally isolated, utility-maximizing indi-
viduals is not contract, but war; contract without language is impossible; 
and contract without social structure and stability is-quite literally-
rationally unthinkable ... . [T]he fundamental root, the base, of contract 
is society.79 
In this view, the core of human life is social interaction and individuals 
are essentially interconnected. The core of contract is not competi-
tion, but cooperation. While specialization of labor entails differentia-
tion among individuals' skills and material resources, it also requires 
cooperative exchange. Thus, specialization of labor, exchange, and 
choice are the "primal roots" of contract.80 As Professor Jay Feinman 
argues: 
Any society in which specialization of labor exists will include exchange, 
and exchange always occurs in a relational context. In any society, even 
the most capitalistic, individualistic one, the production and distribution 
of goods and services are carried on through a variety of exchange mech-
anisms, of which discrete, self-maximizing exchange on a market (the 
paradigm of a neoclassical contract) will be a very small part. ... 81 
Relational contract [theory] . . . emphasizes the interdependence of indi-
viduals in social and economic relationships .. . . [it] focuses on the neces-
sity and desirability of trust, mutual responsibility, and connection 
among people. Not all of these bonds should be legally enforceable, but 
beginning analysis by recognizing them is likely to produce a broader set 
of legal obligations.82 
Thus, the practice of relational contract theory begins by describing 
types of relationship (the theory defines three types: a discrete trans-
action, a discrete transaction which takes place within a system of re-
lationships, and a complex relation) and the norms relevant to each 
relational type: 
79 IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEw SocrAL CoNTRAcr 1 (1980) . 
80 ld. at 2. 
81 Feinman, supra note 12, at 1300-01. 
82 Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 303, 312 
(1992). 
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These norms include both norms generated internally by the parties and 
external social norms. The norms differ depending on the type of case 
under scrutiny. In a discrete transaction, for example, implementing 
planning and effectuating consent are particularly important, while con-
tractual solidarity and flexibility are more important in an ongoing 
relation. 83 
Relationships are classified according to closeness, longevity, and 
complexity. The norms applicable to each type of relationship depend 
in large part on these factors. The next step in relational theorizing is 
to determine how these norms can be implemented through legal 
rules: "For example, while contractual solidarity may be important in 
1 preserving relations, in some situations to impose a legal standard of 
solidarity might create disharmony instead. "84 
Relational contract theory is valuable for a number of purposes. 
I will mention just two. First, relational contract theory is a powerful 
tool in tempering the excesses of the "freedom from contract" compo-
nent of classical contract thinking.85 Gilmore described this core no-
tion of classical contract theory as "no one should be liable to anyone 
for anything. "86 Relational contract theory provides a strong basis 
upon which to argue that people in lasting, reciprocal relationships 
have a variety of obligations to each other, many of which are never 
explicitly stated by the parties. This has been the most widely recog-
nized contribution of relational contract theory.87 
Second, relational contract theory helps focus attention on power 
created by contractual relations and thus on its use and abuse. The 
making of a contract does create power between people. This is the 
element of contract reflected · in the Republican Party's "Contract 
With America" advertisement originally published in the TV. Guide: 
83 Id. at 313. 
84 !d. 
85 Cf Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of 
Contract, 78 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992). 
86 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
87 See Bill Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 
545 (observing that Macneil's ideas on contract presentation have been more widely accepted 
than his other ideas). 
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A campaign 
. promise 
is one thing. 
A signed contract 
is quite another. 
Cogs or Cyborgs? 
Republican House 
candidates have 
signed a-contract 
with America . 
U we break 
this contract, 
throw us out. 
We mean it.88 
Sure Americans are suspicious of politicians, with good reason. But if 
you have a CONTRACT, then you can control the guy. He can't slip 
away like he could from a mere campaign promise. 
The formation of a contract creates formal juridical power, in the .. 
ability of ·one party to call upon the power of the state to hold the 
other to her or his word. A contract also may create informal material 
power if one party becomes dependent on the other for needed goods 
or services. Finally, a contract may create informal political power, in 
the ability each party may have to criticize the other and to hold the 
other publicly accountable for a failure to fulfill her or his contractual 
commitments. 
The powers created by contracts are sometimes abused, and it is 
important to name and to understand these powers in order to address 
instances of abuse. This is a task for contract theory. The doctrines of 
contract modification (the pre-existing duty rule and its variations and 
reformations) and economic duress have been much less useful than . 
they could be because they have· lacked a language and analysis of 
contractual power. Relational contract law offers the possibility of 
strengthening these doctrinal tools. 
· Relational theory is not helpful, however, in addressing the prac-
tices of exploitation, powerlessness, and marginalization that contract 
ideology justifies or conceals. In this observation, I draw on Professor 
Iris Young's elaboration of "five faces" of structural oppression:89 ex-
ploitation, which refers to "a steady process of the transfer of the re-
88 T.V. GuiDE, Oct. 22-28, 1994. I am grateful to Professor Andre Hampton for this 
reference. 
89 IRis M. YoUNG, JusTICE AND THE PoLITics OF DIFFERENCE 39-65 (1990). 
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suits of the labor of one social group to benefit another";90 
marginalization, in which groups of people are "expelled from useful 
participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe ma-
terial deprivation and even extermination";91 powerlessness, the posi-
tion of those "over whom power is exercised without their exercising 
it"92 and who therefore are prevented from developing their skills, 
creativity, and "sense of self ";93 cultural imperialism, which involves 
"the universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture"94 
such that "the dominant meanings of a society render the particular 
perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they ster-
eotype one's group and mark it as the Other";95 and systematic vio-
lence, which includes acts of violence against members of a group and 
,the social context that "makes them [the acts] possible and even ac-
ceptable."96 These categories or criteria of oppression provide useful 
language about different kinds and dynamics of group oppression.97 
Although contract thinking is implicated in each of these forms of op-
pression, the first three-exploitation, marginalization, and 
powerlessness-are most directly involved in many contracting situa-
tions. Inasmuch as cultural imperialism involves a devaluing of the 
skills and products of white women and women and men of color, this 
is also implicated in contracting practices. 
Jay Feinman suggests that relational theory does address issues of 
exploitation and powerlessness, but his claim is unconvincing. Com-
paring two cases in which insurance agents promised terms that were 
not finally included in the policies, Feinman argued that relational 
contract theory would treat "inequality of status" as relevant to the 
insurance companies' legal obligations.98 In the first case, Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America v. Clark,99 an insurance agent promised a 
Vietnam-bound Marine that his insurance policy would be issued 
without a war-risk exclusion, and the court enforced the promise. In 
90 Id. at 49. 
91 Id. at 53. 
92 Id. at 56. 
93 Id. at 57. 
94 /d. at 59. 
95 /d. at 58-59. 
96 !d. at 61. 
97 As Professor Young notes, racism in the United States condemns many African-Ameri-
cans and Hispanics to marginalization, for example, even though many members of these groups 
escape that form of oppression. Many African-Americans and Hispanics suffer exploitation and 
powerlessness, as do many white working-class women and men. Women are subject to gender-
based violence, exploitation, cultural imperialism, and powerlessness. Gay men, by comparison, 
generally are not subject to exploitation as gay men, although they are subject to homophobic 
cultural imperialism and violence. !d. at 64. 
98 Feinman, supra note 82, at 314. 
99 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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the second case, Marker v. Preferred Fire Insurance Co.,10o an insur-
ance agent promised to give notification of the expiration of a prop-
erty insurance policy to the owner, Marker, who was himself an 
attorney and an insurance agent, and the court did not enforce the 
promise. Feinman begins by noting that "each case presents a some-
what discrete situation; in neither case is there an extensive relation-
ship between the parties. Therefore, analysis should begin by focusing 
on the presence of planning and other indicia of consent."101 Feinman 
continues: 
However, neither case is entirely discrete; each has some relational char-
acteristics. In Clark, the significance of the relationship is the expert role 
assunled by the agent relative to the insured, and the extent of the insur-
ance company's power to control the,terms of the formal contract which is 
issued subsequent to the agent's representations about its contents. 
Both of these elements arise because the specific events occur within a 
complex, bureaucratic system for the sale of insurance. These character-
istics carry with them a heightened obligation. In the final step of the 
process, note that the imposition of liability is likely to strengthen the 
relation; insurance companies will be more inclined to control their 
agent's sales talk, or suffer the consequences. In Marker, on the other 
hand, the extent of the property purchaser's dependence on the agent is 
lower, because of the more equal status of the parties and because of the 
purchaser's statements explicitly disclaiming the possibility of a long-
term business relationship with the agent.102 
Feinman does not explain why, within the terms of relational the-
ory, an expert role and the power to control the terms of the formal 
contract "carry . .. a heightened obligation" and why the relative "sta-
tus" of the parties (by which Feinman apparently means class) relates 
to the "extent" of "dependance." Feinman's claims seem to be wish-
ful thinking. It is true that the "norms" identified by relational con-
tract theory are both descriptive and normative: they both reflect 
expectations many people may have in similar relations and prescribe 
standards to which parties ought to conform in order to sustain the 
relation. But to say that relations between people of unequal power 
and status will be unstable unless the more powerful party assumes "a 
higher obligation" is to beg the question of why the parties or anyone 
else would expect relations between unequals to be stable? There is 
nothing in relational contract law that says transactions may not be 
discrete; by the same token, there is nothing in relational contract the-
ory that says discrete transactions cannot be exploitative, marginaliz-
ing, or both. 
According to many critical contract theorists, contract ideology 
persists because it is deeply entwined with regnant narratives of 
100 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973). 
101 Feinman, sup ra note 82, at 314. 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
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human life and social hierarchy. As Professor Elizabeth Mensch ob-
serves, contract thinking makes "actual domination appear free, natu-
ral, and rational. "103 Professor Patricia Williams describes a 
connection between contract and domination: "Contract law reduces 
life to fairly tale. The four comers of the agreement become parent. 
Performance is the equivalent of passive obedience to the parent."104 
Comparing Judge Sorkow's decision enforcing the surrogacy contract 
in Baby M105 with the contract of sale of her great-great-grandmother 
at the age of eleven, Williams observes: 
In both situations, the real mother had no say; her powerlessness was 
imposed by state law that made her and her child helpless in relation to 
the father. ... The contract-reality in both instances was no less than 
magic:'it was illusion transformed into not-illusion. Furthermore it mas-
terfully disguised the brutality of enforced arrangements in which these 
women's autonomy, their flesh and their blood, was locked away in word 
vaults, without room to reconsider-ever.106 
One reason for the persistence of contract thinking, then, is that it 
makes sense of the world in a reassuring way. If all human relations 
are matters of choice, then one can avoid harm by making good 
choices. And as Mensch suggests, this belief conceals actual 
injustice.107 
Another theme in some critical contract theory, though, is that 
contract, as a set of thoughts and practices that affirm human agency 
and human freedom, can be life-enriching as well as life-threatening. 
Professor Regina Austin makes this argument regarding African-
American street vendors: 
Street vending fills a small part of the void created by the economic 
marginalization of black Americans as workers, owners, and consumers. 
103 Mensch, supra note 50, at 767. See also, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction 
of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1113 (1985); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to 
Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829 (1983); Mary Louise Fellows, His to Give, His to Receive, 
Hers to Trust: A Response to Carol Rose, 44 FLA. L. REv. 329 (1993); Mary Jo Frug, Re-reading 
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985); Robert 
W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 195 
(1987); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1685 (1976); Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on Contract Law and 
Practice, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 223. 
104 PATRICIA J. WILUAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 225 (1991). 
105 In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 537 A .2d 
1227 (N.J. 1988). 
106 WILUAMS, supra note 104, at 225-26. 
107 Professor Robert Gordon argues that contract law informs perceptions about the world, 
which in tum validate the underlying contract ideology: 
[TJhe law embodies a set of fantasies about the world that become real when people act 
upon them as if they are real: when, for example people accept the terms of a deal imposed 
upon them by powerful others as the product of circumstances and their own volition rather 
than simply of the power of others .... 
Robert W. Gordon, Macauley, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Conrract 
Law, 1985 Wrs. L. REv. 565, 578. 
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Illegal, informal street vending employs people. It supplies blacks with 
goods they need and want. It contributes to the maintenance of black 
culture. It challenges nonblack businesses in black enclaves. It helps 
people gain the capital and know-how to operate businesses in the for-
mal sector. Finally, it is the site of grassroots activity that could lead to 
new initiatives uniting the political and economic concerns of blacks.1os 
This view of exchange suggests a healing dimension of contract. Pro-
fessor Marjorie Schultz argues in a similar vein that even though con-
tract has contributed to their subordination, women can benefit from 
reclaiming some aspects of contract thinking: 
[W]e desperately need diversification, the respect for diversity, the re-
spect for individualization, that is the good part of the ideology and real-
ity obf [contractual] ordering. While women have many, many things in 
common, they also have many differences from one another. And we 
.simply cannot resolve the massive problems . .. [among us] without us-
ing some tool that gives effect to diverse, individual, private commit-
ments, and decisions.I09 
In this way, core contract values of freedom and agency are linked 
with values of interdependence and mutual regard. 
In both of these themes, critical contract theory invites examina-
tion of multiple power relations implicated in contract ideology. This 
is an invitation for lawyers to shift attention from the "truth value" of 
contract thinking to the social and political consequences of particular 
ideas. 
Although Gilmore undertook to examine the history and politics 
of contract theory, his study was limited by his failure to analyze the 
continuing strength of contract ideology. Contemporary contract the-
orists have provided greater insight into this phenomena. Contempo-
rary society is in the grips of contract thinking, yet as Gilmore 
suggested, contract creates or perpetuates injustice. How, then, 
should judges, lawyers, and law teachers think about the current state 
of contract law and theory? How can we help to make this area of law 
more just? In order to think about these questions, we need a better 
image of contemporary society and its members. Not cogs but 
cyborgs. 
III. CYBORGIAN CoNTRACT META-THEORY 
While Gilmore undercuts the force of his blasphemy, historian 
Donna Haraway employs hers as a vehicle for creative political and 
108 Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black 
Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994). 
109 Presentation by Marjorie Schultz, in Mary Becker, et al., 1989 American Assoc. Law 
Schools' Annual Meeting, SALT Panel on The Idea of Justice: The Role of Legal Education 
(New Orleans, Louisiana Jan. 5-8, 1989) (audio tapes) (I am grateful to Professor Marjorie 
Schultz for making the tapes of this presentation available to me.) . 
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theoretical movement. For her, blasphemy and irony are theoretical 
and political methodologies: 
Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. I 
know of no better stance to adopt from within the secular-religious, ev-
angelical traditions of United States politics. . . . Blasphemy protects 
one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for 
community. Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions 
that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the ten-
sion of holding incompatible things together because both or all are nec-
essary and true. Irony is about humor and serious play. It is also a 
rhetorical strategy and a political method. . . . At the center of my ironic 
faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.l10 
A cyborg is "a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and or-
ganism. "111 A cyborg is, in other words, an ironic and blasphemous 
woman, a woman of power, political influence, and sass.112 Cyborgs 
are interconnected, but they are not cogs-far from it. With Professor 
Patricia Williams, cyborgs see law as rhetorical gesture, as momentary 
play of a most serious sort: 
That life is complicated is a fact of great analytic importance. Law too 
often seeks to avoid this truth by making up its own breed of narrower, 
simpler, but hypnotically powerful rhetorical truths. Acknowledging, 
challenging, playing with these as rhetorical gestures is, it seems to me, 
necessary for any conception of justice. Such acknowledgment compli-
cates the supposed purity of gender, race, voice, boundary; it allows us to 
acknowledge the utility of such categorizations for certain purposes and 
the necessity of their breakdown on other occasions.113 
Unlike Allan Farnsworth, Robert Hillman, and others,114 cyborgs 
do not call for the end of contract theorizing. Quite the contrary, 
cyborgs want more. They want a multitude of contract theories, a 
swarm of contract theories, feeding both from within and without law, 
a wired buzz of contract theories, disorderly, convincing, and ironic. 
Like Grant Gilmore, Carol Smart, and others, though, cyborgs avoid 
"grand theory."l15 Meta-theory is momentary, a thing you do for 
110 HARAWAY, supra note 50, at 149. 
A Cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social 
reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is Jived social relations, our most impor-
tant political construction, a world-changing fiction. . . . The cyborg is a matter of fiction 
and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth 
century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and 
social reality is an optical illusion. 
!d. 
111 ld. 
112 Sass is, after all, the form of many women 's blasphemy. See, e.g., Sandra Cisneros, Loose 
Woman , in LoosE WOMAN 112 (1994). 
113 WILUAMS, supra note 104, at 10. 
114 E. Allan Farnsworth, A Fable and A Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 206 (1987); 
Robert Hillman, supra note 12. 
115 HARAWAY, supra note 50, at 181 ("Race, gender, and capital require a cyborg theory of 
wholes and parts. There is no drive in cyborgs to produce total theory, but there is an intimate 
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short periods of time, without lasting structure, while grand theory is 
the stuff that makes you think you can give up trying to understand.116 
With Gilmore, Friedrich Kessler, and many others, cyborgs see 
contract as deeply conflicted and richly complex.117 And they see con-
tract theory as inevitably limited. "Cyborg writing is about the power 
to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of 
seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. "118 
Viewing legal rules as rhetorical gestures (in the philosophical sense of 
that term, as temporary renditions of indeterminate situations deter-
minate for the purposes of action), cyborgs view theory as a process of 
discovery and as protection against the greatest danger of rhetoric: 
that pe6ple will think that temporary resolutions are permanently 
true. Cyborg thought is compelling-we do need more contract theo-
ries_ .and should embrace them as contradictory. 
There are two reasons why this is so. The first is strategic: we 
need a multitude of contract theories because contract ideology (par-
ticularly the individualistic strand featured in classical and neoclassical 
contract theory) is persistent, and alternative accounts of human con-
nection, including serious versions of reliance, unjust enrichment, un-
conscionability, and good faith doctrine, are short-lived. Many people 
in the United States adhere to individualistic contract ideology non-
consciously, without considering it to be a distinctive set of thoughts 
experience of boundaries, their construction and deconstruction."). See GILMORE, supra note 1, 
at 111-12; CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND TiiE POWER OF LAW 66-89 (1989); Martha A. Fmeman, 
introduction to AT TiiE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY xi-xii (Martha A. 
Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991); bell hooks, Theory as Liberatory Practice, 4 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1991). 
116 I am using the term "meta-theory'' in its conventional sense as a theory about theory, but 
my understanding of the concept and the practice is shaped by Peggy Davis's analysis of "going 
meta." Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and 
"Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1635, 1636 (1991) ("In describing the social stance of stig-
matized people, Erving Goffman refers to a tendency to "go meta"-to withdraw from fully 
focused participation in a social scene and to attend instead to the interactive dynamics of the 
scene. ") (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NoTES ON TiiE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDEN-
TITY 111 (1963)). 
117 See KEssLER & GILMORE, supra note 17, at 2 ( "In our modern society, a tension exists 
between those values favoring individual freedom and those favoring social control. . . . Small 
wonder, then, that modem contract law reproduces the same tension within itself, drawing much 
of its drama and vitality from our divided commitment to individual freedom and social con-
trol."); FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, TEACHER'S MANUAL, CONTRACT CASES AND 
MATERIALS 4 (1972) ("In selecting these materials we have tried to resist the temptation of 
making it appear that everything fits together in a well-designed and neatly carpentered struc-
ture. The case law of the past half-century is notable for its chaotic richness and its unruly 
diversity."); cf Dalton, supra note 103; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976). While these writers see a conflict in contract be-
tween individual freedom and social control, others see quite different conflicts. 
118 HARAWAY, supra note 50, at 175; see also CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, HAMLET'S MOTHER 
AND On-JER WOMEN 103 (1990). 
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and perceptions, because it corresponds with their learned perceptions 
of life. Moreover, most do not have reason to question this ideology, 
because it generally serves their interests, at least as those interests 
are perceived through the lens of contract ideology.n9 It is unlikely 
that individualistic contract ideology will wither away, and it is pre-
dictable that serious challenges to it will be relatively short-lived. In 
Barnett's metaphor, it is not possible to open the airplane window, 
even if the airplane is on the ground and in need of ventilation. This is 
not to say that challenges to contract ideology are not worthwhile or 
their achievements insignificant. In fact, that is the whole point: if 
change cannot be long-lasting, then we should seek more of it. Tem-
porary legal victories can bring moments of peace, places of safety and 
creation, experiences of human dignity, and occasions of justice. 
Professor Derrick Bell has chronicled a similar phenomenon re-
garding civil rights in the United States, the history of which Bell de-
scribes as "a pattern of cyclical progress and cyclical regression. "120 
Doctrinal and legislative innovations that challenge existing social and 
political arrangements seem to have remarkably short half-lives. The 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964,121 for example, provided effective tools for 
numerous struggles against racial and gender subordination during the 
1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, however, courts had developed a set of 
interpretations and judicial restrictions that undermined the effective-
ness of these statutes. The Civil Rights Amendments of 1991122 can 
be seen as a kind of half-life extension, perhaps prolonging the utility 
of these provisions for a few more years. But soon, if not already, a 
new set of tools will be needed. The ideologies of white racism, patri-
archy, heterosexism, class privilege, and ablism are strongly rooted in 
United States culture, and they continue to serve the interests of those 
who most powerfully influence public discourse. For many people, 
adherence to these ideologies is unexamined and unlikely to be ex-
119 Cf Catharine A . MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs: J. WOMEN IN CuU~ & Soc'Y 635 n.3 (1983) (" (T]he perspective from 
the male standpoint is not always each man's opinion, although most men adhere to it, noncon-
sciously and without considering it a point of view, as much because it makes sense of their 
experience (the male experience) as because it is in their interest. It is rational for them. A few 
men reject it; they pay. Because it is the dominant point of view and defines rationality, women 
are pushed to see reality in its terms, although this denies their vantage point as women in that it 
contradicts (at least some of) their lived experience ... . The intractability of maleness as a form 
of dominance suggests that social constructs, although they ftow from human agency, can be less 
plastic than nature has proven to be."). 
120 DERRICK BELL, FACES AT TiiE BOITOM OF TiiE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 98 
(1992). 
121 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 
16 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)). 
122 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, and in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1988 and Supp. V 1993)). 
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amined. Thus, the struggle for justice requires ongoing invention, 
constant innovation, in contract as elsewhere. 
The second reason why we need a multitude of contract theories 
is substantive, related to the nature of contract ideology and law. As 
it exists and is maintained among us, contract is not conducive to mon-
olithic theorizing because it is not one thing and does not stand in one 
position. To say that we employ different and conflicting theories, 
then, is not to admit failure of theory, but rather to recognize effective 
strategy. Professor Carol Smart makes a similar point regarding legal 
theory generally: "I have argued against the idea of a theory of law 
and the 'cievelopment of a totalizing theory. . . . The problem which 
then arises is whether, without such· a general theory, it is ever possi-
ble t6 develop anything other that ad hoc tactics. Yet this is really a 
false problem .. . . "123 It is a false problem, Smart explains, because by 
its nature, law is not conducive to grand theorizing or monolithic tac-
tics, "law does not stand in one position," and law is "refracted" in the 
sense that "the development of law is not one of simple linear 
progress. "124 
(T]he vision of law I have outlined is not one that is unified but re-
fracted . ... That is to say that law does not have one single appearance, 
it is different according to whether one refers to statute law, judge-made 
law, administrative law, the enforcement of law, and so on. It is also 
refracted in that it is frequently contradictory even at the level of stat-
ute .... The law is also refracted in the sense that it has different applica-
tions according to who attempts to use it. For example, migrant families 
using the "right to family life" against repressive governments which 
prevent such families from living together (is quite different from] indi-
vidual men [using] the "right to family life" against individual women in 
order to defeat women's autonomy .... Finally law may have quite dif-
ferent effects depending on who is the subject of the law. Hence abor-
tion laws may have different meanings for black or native women on 
whom abortions are pressed, than for white women who feel they can 
exercise "choice." So if law does not stand in one place, have one direc-
123 CAROL SMART, supra note 115, at 163. 
124 /d. at 97. Smart explains the concept of law as "refracted" through the example of law's 
relationship to women's bodies: 
The law does not have a completely unified policy in relation to women or women's bodies. 
Hence we have coexisting legislation in the UK which, on the one hand legalizes medical 
abortions, and on the other seeks to protect foetal life. Moreover, we can see that we have 
moved from a position where law simply acted punitively in relation to questions of bas-
tardy or abortion, to a state of highly differentiated responses to new fields like adoption, in 
vitro fertilization, surrogacy, contraception, AIDS, and the rights of embryos. Some of 
these responses may appear more liberal than traditional legal strategies, but their power to 
intervene and inspect the private lives and lifestyles of women, should warn us against as-
suming that these modes are automatically less oppressive because they, for the most part, 
avoid criminal sanctions. Hence the term "refracted" is used to indicate that the develop-
ment of law is not one of simple linear progress. 
!d. 
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tion, or have one consequence, it follows that we cannot develop one 
strategy or one policy in relation to it.12s 
Contract law, like all law, does not stand in one place. It is re-
fracted in all of the ways identified by Smart: it is very different in its 
different forms, it is inconsistent even within a single form, it has dif-
ferent applications according to who attempts to use it, and it has 
quite different effects depending on who is the subject of the law. 
Contract theorists have studied the first two of these rather exten-
sively. Scholars have examined the different manifestations of con-
tract law in the statutes, judicial decisions, administrative regulations, 
and informal compliance systems.126 Contradictions within contract 
law, particularly within judge-made law, have been extensively ana-
1lyzed. Gilmore's discussion of the contradiction between bargained-
for consideration and promissory estoppel is one example. It is not 
surprising that these efforts have given rise to and been influenced by 
several different and conflicting contract theories. 
The third and fourth aspects of refraction in contract law have 
been less widely explored. While practitioners do know that the rules 
of contract law tend to have different applications depending on who 
uses them, and the phenomenon has been named by some feminist 
and critical race scholars, still this phenomenon has not been widely 
studied or theorized. This is somewhat surprising, considering the dif-
ferent applications evident in oft-studied pairs of cases such as Kirksey 
v. Kirksey127 and Langer v. Superior Steel Corp. 128 (involving the re-
quirement of bargained-for consideration); Webb v. McGowin 129 and 
Harrington v. Taylor130 (involving promises for benefits received); 
United Steel Workers of America, Local 1330 v. United States Steel 
Corp. 131 and State Bank of Standish v. Curry132 (involving promissory 
estoppel); and Torres v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.133 and A & M 
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.134 (involving oral statements and the duty 
125 !d. at 164. 
126 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of 
Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 507 (1977); G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for 
Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1198 (1988). 
127 8 Ala. 131 (1845) . 
128 161 A. 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932), rev 'd on other grounds, 178 A. 490 (Pa. 1935). 
129 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). 
130 36 S.E.2d 227 (N.C. 1945). 
131 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in parr and vacated in part, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 
1980). 
132 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993). 
133 438 So. 2d 757 (Ala. 1983). Johnson v. State Fann Ins. Co., 587 So. 2d 974,977 (Ala. 1991) 
cites Torres as implicitly overruled by Hickox v. Stover, 551 So. 2d 259 (Ala. 1989) on the appli-
cation of a duty to read in consumer transactions. 
134 186 CaL Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
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to read).135 Similarly, although lawyers know that the rules of con-
tract' law have very different consequences depending on who is sub-
jected to its rules and students can see this when they think carefully 
about cases like Acedo v. Department of Pub. Welfare,136 Inman v. 
Clyde Hall Drilling Co.,137 Lucy v. Zehmer,13B and State v. Wheeler,l39 
there has not been sustained theoretical attention to the different con-
sequences of legal rules for different groups of people. Questions fa-
miliar to critical work in other disciplines-"who benefits?" and "who 
is burdened?" -are yet to be asked of many of the rules and princi-
ples of contract law. 
The relative lack of attention to these third and fourth aspects of 
law's refrJ1ction is significant be~ause _it helps to explain why contract 
theorists have given little attention to_issues of oppression. Relational 
contra,ct theory, thought by many to be the most expansive and pro-
ductive of current approaches, does not provide tools for analysis of 
power created not by the contract itself, but by social positioning 
apart from the contract. Critical contract theory has looked at some 
aspects of the connection betweeri contract and ·social positioning, but . 
more work is needed, · · 
In the United States, a person's social power is profoundly af-
fected by her or his race, class, and gender positioning. Yet the indi-
vidualist s~rand in contract ideology denies the significa·nce of social 
position. Further, mos~ contract theorists have ignored how applica-
tion of the rules of contract law is affected by the social position of the 
person attempting to use the rules and how the consequences of a 
particular rule are affected by the position of the person who is subject 
to it. In this way, contract theories and the law that is informed by 
them have operated to justify or to conceal group-based oppression, 
including exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness. We need. 
new and different theories to focus and enable analysis of these as-
pects of contract. Moreover, as these parts of contract coexist with 
. the genuine liberatory practices of choice, trust, interdependence, and 
the like, we must expect each theory to conflict with others we find 
valuable. 
135 Some of these pairings are featured in many contract law casebooks. See, e.g., CHARLES 
L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CoNTRAcr LAw (3_d ed: 1993); EDwARDS. 
MURPHY & RICHARD E. SpEIDEL, STUDIES IN CoNTRAcr LAW (4th ed. 1991). 
136 513 P.2d. 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (consequence of application of duty to read is loss of 
parental rights). · 
137 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1962) (consequence of application of rule requiring strict fulfillment 
of condition is that worker loses all rights under an employment contract). 
138 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954) (consequence of application of rule that "objective" manifesta-
tion of assent is binding, regardless of actual intent is loss of the defendant's family farm). 
139 631 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1981) (consequence of application of rule a.Ilowing offeror to revoke 
prior to acceptance is prosecutor can withdraw from plea bargain). 
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One way that contract thinking, with its featured notions of con-
sent, choice, and control, has served to justify and to conceal· oppres-
sion can be seen in the case of Coolidge v. Pua 'aiki and Kea, 140 
decided in 1877 by the American-controlled Supreme Court of the 
Kingdom of Hawai'i. This case demonstrates the role of contract 
thinking in the exploitation of hundreds of thousands of local and im-
migrant workers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.141 
The case involved two Hawai'ian workers caught fleeing a sugar plan-
tation. During the 1870s, thousand~ of plantation workers were ar-
rested for attempting to escape plantations, and most were returned 
with sentences of additional hard labor.142 In Coolidge, Pua'aiki and 
Kea argued that the plantation owner ought not to be able to force 
their return; the court rejected their arguments, writing: 
The laborers signed the contract intelligently and there is no allegation 
made that either of the parties here has been sent to any place or sub-
jected to any exposure which was not reasonably contemplated by them-
selves when they signed the contract. If they wished to confine 
themselves to any particular kind of labor, they should have themselves 
caused it to have been designated in their contract; so, likewise, if they 
had wished the space, over which they were to be sent, to have been 
specially limited, they should have caused it to be inserted in their 
contact.143 
Translating the situation into the language of contract and refusing to 
acknowledge obligations, including obligations of respect, beyond the 
written form, plantation masters were able to deny responsibility to 
workers beyond the obligation to pay wages. Evoking contract law, 
the court affirmed this denial, going so far as to suggest that individual 
workers could have negotiated additional express terms in their labor 
contracts with the plantation masters. 
While there is no surviving evidence regarding the conditions sur-
rounding the making of Pua'aiki's and Kea's contracts, the general 
140 3 Haw. 810 (1877). 
141 For information on the Hawaiian sugar industry and the Supreme Court of the Kingdom 
of Hawai'i, see EDWARD D. BEECHERT, WoRKING IN HAwATI: A LABOR HISTORY {1985); JoN 
ClnNEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAwAn's LAND DIVISION oF 1848 (1958); KATHERINE CoMAN, 
THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT LABOR IN THE HAW AllAN ISLANDS {1903); GAVAN DAWS, SHOAL 
OF TIME (1968); MICHl KoDAMA·NisHIMOTO ET AL., HANAHAN A: AN ORAL HISTORY ANTHOL-
OGY OF HAWAll'S WORKING PEOPLE (1984); RALPH KUYXENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 
1778-1854 (1938); JOYCE C. LEBRA, WOMEN'S VOICES IN HAWAll {1991); ANDREW W. LIND, AN 
ISLAND COMMUNITY (1938); RONALD TAKAI<l, PAU liANA: PLANTATION LIFE AND LABOR IN 
HAw An 1835-1920 (1983); Karen N. Blondin, A Case for Reparations f.:Jr Native Hawai'ians, 16 
HAW. B.J. 13 {1981); Maivlin Clech Urn, The Kuleana Act Revisited: The Survival of Traditional 
Hawai'ian Commoner Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L. REv. 233 {1989); Maivan Clech Urn, The 
Imposition of Anglo-American Land Tenure Law on Hawai 'ians, 23 J. PLURAUSM & UNOFFI· 
CIAL L. 103 {1985). 
142 See BEECHERT, supra note 141, at 40-57; TAKAKI, supra note 130, at 71-75. 
143 Coolidge, 3 Haw. at 814. 
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practice of labor contracting by sugar planters in Hawai'i is well-
known. Professor Ronald Takaki describes the practice regarding 
Chinese immigrant workers in 1870: 
After their arrival in the city, Chinese workers were herded into a labor 
market for assignment to the plantations. They were marched to a yard 
near the customhouse and guarded by soldiers. The planters and their 
agents inspected the laborers and made their selections. The Chinese 
laborers were then made to sign labor contracts that specified the period 
of service required, wages, board, housing, medical care, and other 
terms.144 
Similar prai:tices were used in the formation of labor contracts with 
Hawai'ian women and men, and with women and men from Portugal, 
Japan, ~orea, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.14s Having signed the 
labor contracts, workers were paid menial wages, required to work 
seventy hours or more each week, given crowded living areas with 
little or no sanitation, provided little or no medical care, and subjected 
to harsh punishment for resistance.146 By translating these arrange-
ments into the language of contract, the court both justified and con-
cealed the exploitation and powerlessness of these workers. While 
appearing to apply a simple rule of contract interpretation in an 
impartial fashion, the court refused to acknowledge any additional 
information beyond the badly translated contract document. Would 
the court have approached interpretation of an executive's contract in 
a similarly narrow fashion? 
Other decisions, both old and new, have left lawyers with similar 
questions. Compare, for example, Kirksey v. Kirksey141 and Langer v. 
Superior Steel Corp. 148: why was the brother-in-law's promise viewed 
as gratuitous in Kirksey, while the company's promise in Langer was 
viewed as not gratuitous? If we see a distinction, does it rest on a 
gendered notion of value and desire reducible to the idea that Kirksey 
should not have expected to hold her brother-in-law to his word, while 
Langer should have expected to hold the company? For more recent 
144 TAKAKI, supra note 141, at 32. 
145 Rates of pay for contract workers were set on the basis of race and gender. /d. at 77-78. 
146 Of Masters and Servants, COMPILED LAWS OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM ch. 30 (Honolulu: 
Hawaiian Gazette, 1884) (re-enactment of the Act of June 21st, 1850, "For the Government of 
Masters and Servants."). Section 1419 provided that any person who absents himself from ser-
vice shall be ordered by the judge to work for two times the length of his absence after expira-
tion of the original contract, up to one year. Section 1420 provided that if any person resists such 
an order he shall be put in prison, "there to remain, at hard labor, until he consents to serve 
according to law." This Section also provides for tines for repeat offenses. It is likely that this 
act was also written by Judge William Lee. See BEECHERT, supra note 141, at 41-42. Professor 
Beechert concludes: "By the end of Hawaiian independence, the contract labor law, despite 
frequent amendments designed to protect the rights of the worker, had evoked into a system of 
servitude." ld. at 57. 
147 8 Ala. 131 (1845). 
148 161 A. 571 (Pa. Super. a . 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 178 A. 490 (Pa. 1935). 
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cases, compare United Steel Workers of America, Local1330 v. (/nited 
Steel Corp. 149 and State Bank of Standish v. Curry.150 In Loca/1330, 
the court interpreted words of assurance from the plant manager to 
the steelworkers not to be promissory, while in Bank of Standish, very 
similar words by a bank officer to a commercial farmer were treated 
by the court as a promise. Surely there are several possible reasons to 
distinguish the cases, but is one very significant factor that middle-
class people tend to think of the relationships between a factory 
owner and factory workers as adversarial, while they tend to think of 
the relationship between a bank and a farmer as cooperative? These 
class- and race-based assumptions are empirically dubious, but never-
theless lead courts to apply doctrines of contract interpretation in dif-
ferent ways acco:rding to the identity and social positioning of the 
people involved.151 
Cases involving the duty to read provide other examples. Com-
pare Torres v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 152 where the court im-
posed a duty to read on a purchaser of home insurance, with A & M 
Produce v. FMC Corp.,153 where the court did not impose a duty to 
read on a commercial farmer. In cases involving nonmerchants or 
nonprofessionals, particularly those who are perceived by judges to be 
outsiders to the market, as are many men and women of color and 
white women, judges often seem drawn to use the rules of contract 
interpretation to educate the outsider to follow practices that are tra-
ditionally viewed as "good business practice," like reading the docu-
ments, writing out each term of the contract in detail, and keeping 
copies of important documents.154 In cases involving commercial ac-
tors, in contrast, judges frequently are willing to defer to informal 
business practices, which often include not reading the documents, not 
writing out every term in detail, and not keeping copies. Indeed, 
U.C.C. § 2-207 is based on the assumption that businesspeople will 
149 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). 
150 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993). 
151 See also Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C. 1977) (holding that 
students should not have interpreted the university bulletin to include a commitment by the 
university); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991) (holding that Mary 
Rowe's employment contract with Montgomery Ward should not be interpreted to require cause 
for tennination, even though the sales manager told Rowe at the time of hiring that she would 
have a job so long as she achieved her sales quota). 
152 438 So.2d 757 (Ala. 1983). Johnson v. State Farm Ins. Co., 587 So.2d 974, 977 (Ala. 1991) 
cites Torres as implicitly overruled by Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259 (Ala. 1989) on the issue of 
application of the duty to read in consumer transactions. 
153 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. a. App. 1982). 
154 See also St. Landry Loan Co. v. Avie, 147 So.2d 725 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that 
Arthur Skinner, a black man who spoke French and not English, was liable on a note written in 
English despite evidence that he had been told by the Loan Company agent that the document 
would not make him personally liable). 
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not read the documents.155 1bis dualism reflects a historical split be-
tween a view of contract law as imposing social control and a view of 
contract law as facilitating and supporting business practice. This split 
has tended to play out in the United States along lines of class, race, 
and gender.l56 In this and other ways, courts apply the rules of con-
tract interpretation differently when the rules are evoked by persons 
in positions of relative powerlessness against persons with greater 
power, not because courts seek to hurt the weaker party, but rather 
because relationships between unequals appear to many judges to in-
vo.lve fewer expectations of trust, good faith, and the like. 
1 Ace do v. Department of Public Welfare, 157 another duty to read 
case, demonstrates a second way in which contract thinking continues 
_ · to justify and conceal group-based subordination. Herlinda Marie 
Acedo, an eighteen-year-old woman earning a low income, requested 
the Coconino County Department of Public Welfare to return her 
seven-month-old child, taken from her under an agreement that 
Acedo thought she could revoke at any time during a six month pe-
riod. Acedo asked for her child's return less than three weeks after 
the infant had been taken from her. She expected to get her baby 
back, because the agency representative had told her that the adop-
tion would not be final for six months and because before the child 
was born she had been allowed to revoke a similar consent to 
adoption. 
The court denied Acedo's request, writing: 
It should be noted that the form gives unconditional consent to the 
placement of the child, and specifically states that the signer relinquishes 
all rights in the child. While the last paragraph of the form does speak in 
future terms, we are of the opinion that the form, taken as a whole, 
clearly indicates that the consent given is immediately effective .. . . 
Here, by signing the consent form, petitioner, a high school graduate 
presumably of at least normal intelligence, manifested her intent to re-
linquish her parental rights in clear and unambiguous terms. When 
asked if she understood it, she replied in the affirmative.158 
In support of its holding, the court cited to a line of cases involving the 
duty to read, under which a person who signs a document is deemed 
155 See U.C.C. § 2-207; JAMES J . WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CoDE 28-31 (3d ed. 1988). 
156 A similar split is evident in the history of the objective theory of contract interpretation. 
See generally Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Conscious-
ness in Some Ton, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269, 294-314 (1994). 
157 513 P.2d 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (consequence of application of duty to read is loss of 
parental rights). 
158 !d. at 1353-54 (emphasis omitted). 
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to consent to every term contained therein.159 This line of cases in-
cludes several construction contracts and a variety of other commer-
cial and noncommercial cases.160 Although the court in Acedo 
acknowledged that adoption is different from other contract situa-
tions, still the court applied the general duty to read rule. The rule is 
said to be justified as a way to encourage the salutary practice of read-
ing what one signs and to protect any reliance by the other side, which 
was minimal in this case. Acedo's loss of her child was an onerous 
price to pay for the lesson. What is the value of being blind to the 
consequences of the duty to read rule applied in this case? Who bene-
fits, and who is burdened? 
In addition to denying or concealing the ways that social position 
influences the application of rules and the consequences of judicial 
decisions, contract thinking conceals harm to subordinated groups in 
another way. Contract thinking undermines efforts to improve the 
condition of those who have been exploited and otherwise oppressed 
by shifting responsibility from the actor to the victim. This dynamic 
can be seen in the struggles of residents of colonias in south Texas, 
where developers "sell" shacks without water, sewerage, or electricity 
under contracts requiring the payment of $100 or more per month for 
100 years161 or rent them for $250 a month or more. Approximately 
340,000 people live in the 1436 impoverished colonias of south Texas; 
despite several years of effort and an array of arguably applicable 
health and commercial statutes, government officials have had little 
success in curbing the sales, rental, and commercial practices of 
colonias developers and landlords. Texas Attorney General Dan 
Morales charged that judges and other officials often are closely asso-
ciated with colonias developers and tend to accept their practices as 
merely a part of normal business practice.162 Many colonias residents 
rightly fear violence and other abusive collection tactics used by the 
developers and landlords. Families who default on their payments are 
forced off the land with little hope of legal defense, even when they 
have already paid thousands of dollars for the land. Even for those 
able to keep up with the monthly payments and the costs of trucking 
in water and other necessities, conditions of life in colonias are 
severe: 
The majority of all communicable diseases reported in Cameron County 
are believed to originate in about 60 colonias. Hundreds of miles to the 
159 ld. at 1353 (citing Hamer v. Hope Cottage Children's Bureau, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1965), which in tum re lies upon a line of duty to read cases). 
160 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Spence & Howe Constr. Co., 356 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1962), aff'd, 365 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1963); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. W.L. Macatee & Sons,l01 S.W.2d 
553 (Tex. 1937), cited in Hamer, 389 S.W.2d, at 126. 
161 Contract of Sale (on file with author). 
162 Editorial: Colonia Profiteering, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Mar. 22, 1995, at 24A. 
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northwest, tuberculosis rates in El Paso County are twice the national 
average . 
. . . By the time children in West Texas colonias reach 8 years of age, 
35 percent have already experienced hepatitis A. By age 35, the rate is 
95 percent . 
. . . At the Del Mar Heights colonia near Brownsville, rainstorms 
turn silt, clay and salt into mud, while overflowing septic tanks spew 
forth raw sewage. Well water can be contaminated from such seepage, 
or from dirty water drained from tubs and sinks into yards. Storing 
drinking water invites contamination when lids are left open. Swarms of 
flies, mosquitoes and other insects thrive in such conditions. Severe 
rasb;s and insect bites on Colonia students obligated Brownsville In-
dependent School District officials to send them home from school in 
1984 and 1991.163 · 
.· ·· Of course, contract ideology is not the sole cause of the injustices 
suffered by colonias residents. It does, however, significantly burden 
efforts to improve conditions in these communities and to change the 
practice of colonias developers because it supplies an easy reason for 
disinterest by those outside the colonias: "People have chosen to live 
there. They want to own their own homes. No injustice can be done 
to one who consents." More contract theory is needed to challenge 
such easy dismissals. 
There is yet another reason for more theory. Ironically, contract 
ideology has operated and continues to operate as liberatory and life 
enhancing. The idea that one may choose one's significant relation-
ships and obligations has given hope to many and has inspired signifi-
cant social change. In addition, contract has been a nursery for new or 
revived ideas in legal thought, able to support growth when other ar-
eas of law have become barren. Recent cases continue this practice, 
as contract law has generated new or refocused doctrine to supple-
ment less generous areas of law. In Reid v. Key Bank of Southern . 
Maine, Inc.,164 for example, the jury found a breach of a contract 
where evidence suggested that the bank had racially discriminated 
against the Reids, but the record was not sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements for a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Simi-
larly in Merk v. Jewel Food Stores,165 the Seventh Circuit used the 
parol evidence rule to protect individual employees against enforce-
ment of a side agreement between their union and Jewel Foods that 
purported to undo their rights under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Even though the National Labor Relations Act has been inter-
preted not to prohibit such secret "side-agreements" and even though 
the written agreement would not normally be treated as integrated, 
the Seventh Circuit held that evidence regarding the secret agreement 
163 Editorial: Las Co/onias, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Oct. 16, 1994, at 21. 
164 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987). 
165 945 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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should be excluded under the parol evidence rule because of its eff~ct 
on the rights of individual employees. 
Numerous other innovative contract law decisions address issues 
of oppression, some of which have been relatively long-lasting, like 
Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw,166 which found a warrant of attorney and 
confession of judgment clause to be unconscionable and therefore un-
enforceable in a home remodeling contract. Other decisions have 
been more quickly struck down, such as Monge v. Beebe Rubber 
Co., 16 7 which held that sexual and racial harassment is a breach of a 
contractual obligation of good faith.168 
Robert Gordon writes of "an underground jurisprudence of eq-
uity" from which innovative ideas about contract are drawn.169 This is 
a nice image. Cyborgs want more. Judge Cardozo contributed much 
generative thought: "We are not to suppose that one party was to be 
placed at the mercy of the other";17o "From the conclusion that 
promises may not be treated as dependent to the extent of their utter-
most minutiae without a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one 
to the conclusion that they may not be so treated without a perversion 
of intention. "171 Cyborgs want more. Cyborgs want images of the 
complex push-pull of contract thinking, of the ways in which contract 
both oppresses and liberates, in which it is both crucial to society and 
destructive of it. In irony and blasphemy, cyborgs see themselves; in 
refracted wholes, cyborgs see the world. 
Assuming that concerns of strategy and substance lead us to seek 
numerous conflicting contract theories and to look especially at the 
interaction between contract and systems of power existing apart from 
contract, I would like to suggest two areas for development of con-
tract theory following work already begun by writers in other disci-
plines. Cyborg eclecticism: Wired to machines invented by crowds, 
generations born of African mathematicians, inventors of the zero, 
cyborgs fix their gaze through the eyes of others. 
166 97 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1953). Many state statutes now prohibit warrant of attorney and confes-
sion of judgment clauses in consumer contracts. 
167 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). In Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) the 
coun reinterpreted Monge as a "public policy" exception to an employer power to terminate an 
at-will employee. 
168 But see Cris Carmody, Panner Can Sue for Age, Sex Bias on Contract Theory, Judge 
Holds, Cm. DAILY L. BuLL., Aug. 21 , 1992, at 1 (reponing decision allowing breach of contract 
action based on allegations of age and gender bias). 
169 Roben W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REv. 195 (1987); cf Deborah Waire Post, Profit, Progress and Mora/Imperatives , 9 TouRO L. 
REv. 487 (1993) (reviewing MEIR TAMAR!, IN THE MARKETPLACE: JEWISH BusrNESS ETHics 
(1991). 
170 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E . 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
171 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921). 
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IV. EQUAL ExcHANGE THEORY 
Many contracts teachers have attempted the difficult task of de-
veloping, within the language of contract, an argument that merchants 
or landlords, doctors or lawyers, ought not to charge the poor more. 
We stand before incredulous classes, some students staring in disbe-
lief, some sneering in disrespect. Many of us give up, shrugging 
against counter-arguments about risks of theft and credit-worthless-
ness. Sure, some merchants and landlords charge more even beyond 
their actual expenses and risks, but what can be said? Perhaps reli-
gion or, morality sets a limit on the size of profit a person might justly 
extractlfrom those subordinated by race, gender, class, or disability, 
but contract law has little to offer beyond the gasping doctrine of 
"suestantive unconscionability." These are moments when familiar 
contract theories fail us. 
Equal Exchange, Inc. is a U.S. company that purchases coffee di-
rectly from Third World farming cooperatives. One of many alterna-
tive trading organizations (ATOs) now operating throughout the 
world, Equal Exchange recognizes the injustice to farmers of interna-
tional market practices and pays above-market prices: 
By setting up direct trading relationships with coffee-farming co-ops, 
ATOs can pay farmers a fair price: a price that covers the costs of pro-
duction, a price that guarantees farmers a living wage for their labor . . .. 
Between 1989 and 1993, Equal Exchange . .. paid $750,000 in 
above-market premiums to small farmers' cooperatives. That's 376% of 
the company's pre-tax profits over that period of time. For the co-ops 
Equal Exchange trade with, that's almost double what they would have 
received on the open market.172 
The purchasing practices of Equal Exchange and other alternative 
trading organizations enacts an alternative theory of contractual 
exchange. 
James Alan McPherson's short story A Loaf of Bread173 develops 
equal exchange theory, exploring exchange as constitutive of social 
order, in a world marked by domination. The story involves Harold 
Green, a white grocer who owns three stores. Like some contempo-
rary merchants, he charges significantly more at his store in the Afri-
172 MAKING COFFEE STRONG: EQUAL EXCHANGE-ALTERNATIVE TRADING IN A CONVEN-
TIONAL WoRLD 7-8 (1995) (brochure, on file with author). The founders of Equal Exchange, 
Inc. are Rink Dickinson, Jonathan Rosenthal, and Michael Rozyne. I am grateful to Carol Cos-
ton, Executive Director of the Partners for the Common Good Loan Fund, and Elise Garcia, St. 
Mary's University School of Law Director of Communications and Development, for introduc-
ing me to Equal Exchange. 
173 James Alan McPherson, A Loaf of Bread, in TERRY McMILLIAN, BREAKING Icr: AN 
ANTIIOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERICAN FICTION 466 (1990). 
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can-American neighborhood than at his store in either the wealthy 
white neighborhood or the poor white neighborhood: 
It was one of those obscene situations, pedestrian to most people, but 
invested with meaning for a few poor folk whose lives are usually spent 
outside the imaginations of their fellow citizens. A grocer named Har-
old Green was caught red-handed selling to one group of people the 
very same goods he sold at lower prices at similar outlets in better neigh-
borhoods. He had been doing this for many years, and at first he could 
not understand the outrage heaped upon him. He acted only from habit, 
he insisted, and had nothing against the people whom he served.174 
Nelson Reed, an assembly-line worker and deacon in the Baptist 
church, uncovered Harold's pricing practices, helped to organize a 
picket at the store, and contacted the local television station. Harold's 
children watched· the news report and the next day, were targeted by 
pickets at their school. Ruth Green insisted that Harold act in re-
sponse to the complaints: " 'One day this week,' she told her hus-
band, 'you will give free, for eight hours, anything your customers 
come in to buy.' "175 Ruth punctuated her request with a threat: 
" '[i]f you refuse, you have seen the last of your children and my-
self.' "176 Still Harold resisted. 
Nelson, for his part, was transformed by exercise of the power of 
organized protest, and his wife, Betty, a thoughtful, complicated, wo-
man,177 became deeply troubled: 
All his life he had trusted in God and gotten along. But now something 
in him capitulated to the reality that came suddenly into focus. " I was 
wrong," he told people who called him. "The onliest thing that matters 
in this world is money. And when was the last time you seen a picture of 
Jesus on a dollar bill?" This line, which he repeated over and over, 
caused a few people to laugh nervously, but not without some affirma-
tion that this was indeed the way things were. Many said they had 
known it all along. Others argued that although it was certainly true, it 
was one thing to live without money and quite another to live without 
faith. But still most callers laughed and said, "You right. You know I 
174 /d. 
175 /d. at 467. 
176 /d. 
177 
Brought to the church after a number of years of living openly with a jazz musician, she had 
embraced religion when she married Nelson Reed. But though she no longer believed com-
pletely in the world, she nonetheless had not fully embraced God. There was something in 
the nature of Christ's swift rise that had always bothered her, and something in the blood 
and vengeance of the Old Testament that was mellowing and refreshing. But she had never 
communicated these thoughts to anyone, especially her husband. Instead she smiled va-
cantly while others professed leaps of faith, remained silent when friends spoke fiercely of 
their convictions. The presence of this vacuum in her contributed to her personal mystery; 
people said she was beautiful, although she was not outwardly so. Perhaps it was because 
she wished to protect this inner beauty that she did not smile now, and looked extremely 
sad, listening to her husband on the telephone. 
/d. at 469. 
172 
·' 
90:132 (1995) Cogs or Cyborgs? 
know you right. Ain't it the truth, though?" Only a few people, among 
them Nelson Reed's wife, said nothing and looked very sad.178 
Seeing her husband's new materialism, Betty withdrew from the 
project. 
Harold, meanwhile, sought advice from his brother-in-law, an in-
surance salesman named Thomas, who suggested alternative 
strategies: 
"So," Thomas answered, "You must fight to show these people the 
reality of both your situation and theirs. How would it be if you visited 
one of their meetings and chalked out, on a blackboard, the dollars and 
cents of your operation? Explain your overhead, your security fees, all 
tl}e additional expenses. If you treat them with respect, they might 
understand." 
Green frowned. "That will never do," he said. "It would be an ad-
.- ' mission of a certain guilt."179 
Still, Harold sensed the need to explain himself to the protestors. In-
stead of a public presentation, Harold decided to meet privately with 
Nelson Reed. And he began preparing for the meeting: 
[T)he grocer resigned himself to explain to Reed, in as finite detail as 
possible, the economic structure of his operation. He vowed to suppress 
no information. He would explain everything: inventories, markups, sale 
items, inflation, balance sheets, specialty items, overhead, and that mys-
terious item called profit. This last item, promising to be the most diffi-
cult to explain, Green and his brother-in-law debated over for several 
hours. They agreed first of all that a man should not work for free, then 
they agreed that it was unethical to ruthlessly exploit. From these pa-
rameters, they staked out an area between fifteen and forty percent, and 
agreed that some place between these two borders lay an amount of 
return that could be called fair.1BO 
Thomas pushed Harold to explain why it was that he felt justified in 
earning a higher profit from his store in the African-American neigh-
178 !d. a t 468. 
179 Id. at 473. 
180 !d. 
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borhood.181 Harold struggled for an answer, but found none 
satisfactory.182 
In the meeting between Nelson and Harold, talk again focused on 
exchange and profit: "The grocer pulled two gray ledgers from his 
briefcase. 'You have for years come into my place,' he told the man. 
'In my memory I have always treated you well. Now our relationship 
has come to this.' "183 
"'All I know,'" Nelson replied, " 'is over at your place a can of 
soup cost me fifty-five cents, and two miles away at your other store 
for white folks, you chargin' thirty-nine cents.' He said this with the 
calm authority of an outraged soul." "'Man, why you want to do peo-
; ple that way?' he asked. 'We human, same as you.' "184 
Harold tried to explain: 
I'll tell you what is in these books . . . In one place, in the area you call 
.· white, I get by barely by smiling lustily at old ladies, stocking gourmet 
food on the chance I will build a reputation as a quality store. The two 
clerks there cheat me; there is nothing I can do . ... The second place is 
on the other side of town, in a neighborhood as poor as this one. . . . I 
use the loss there as a write-off . 
. . . In this area I will admit I make a profit, but it is not so much as 
you think. But I do not make a profit here because the people are black. 
I make a profit because a profit is here to be made .... 185 
Nelson agreed that Harold had a "right" to make a profit, yet he 
insisted that Harold was wrong to take higher profits from this store. 
181 
'Here is a case that will point out an analogy,' he said, licking a cigarillo. 'I read in the 
papers that a family want to sell an electric stove. I call the home and the man says fifty 
dollars. I ask to come out and inspect the merchandise. When I arrive I see they are poor, 
have already bought a new stove that is connected, and are selling the old one for fifty 
dollars because they want it out of the place. The electric stove is in good condition, worth 
much more than fifty. But because I see what I see I offer forty-five.' 
'The man agrees to take forty-five dollars, saying he has had no other calls. I look at the 
stove again and see a spot of rust. I say I will give him forty dollars. He agrees to this, on 
condition that I myself haul it away. I say I will haul it away if he comes down to thirty. 
You, of course, see where I am going.' 
The grocer nodded. 'The circumstances of his situation, his need to get rid of the stove 
quickly, placed him in a position where he has little room to bargain?' 
'Yes,' Thomas answered. 'So? Is it ethical, Harry?' 
Harold Green frowned. He had never liked his brother-in-law, and now he thought the 
insurance agent was being crafty. 
/d. at 473-74. 
182 Harold argued that the buyer's behavior was ethical: "[T)his man does not have to sell! It 
is his choice whether to wait for other calls." " It is the right of the buyer to get what he wants at 
the lowest price possible. That is the rule. That has always been the rule." "Now you see,'' " he 
continued, "Much more than a few dollars is at stake. If this one buyer is to be condemned, then 
so are most people in the history of the world. . . . This code will be here tomorrow, long after 
the ones who do not honor it are not." /d. at 474. 
183 /d. 
184 /d. at 475. 
185 !d. 
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Harold asked for Nelson's sympathy: "'Place yourself in my situation 
... Say on a profit scale from fifteen to forty percent, at what point in 
between would you draw the line?'" Nelson said he would charge 
closer to fifteen than forty. "'How close?'" Harold retorted. " 'In 
church you tithe ten percent.' 'In restaurants you tip fifteen.' . .. 
'Over fifteen.' 'How much over?' .. . 'Twenty, thirty, thirty-five?' " 
Harold taunted Nelson now, chanting percentages. Nelson finally 
broke: " 'Damn this!' "186 
"I ain't you, ... All I is is a poor man that works too hard to see his pay 
slip through his fingers like rainwater." ... "My daddy sharecropped 
down in Mississippi and bought at the company store. He owed them 
twenty-three years when he died. I paid off five of them years and then 
ran awafto up here . .. . Now come to find out, after all my runnin', they 
done lift that same company store up out of Mississippi and slip it down 
on us-here! Well my daddy was a fighter, and if he hadn't owed all them 
yeats he would raise some hell. Me, I'm steady my daddy's child, plus I 
got seniority in my union. I'm a free man. Buddy, don't you know I'm 
gonna raise me some hell! "187 
That night, Ruth again tried to convince Harold to hold the give-
away and he continued to resist, " 'I will not do it!' " " 'Of course 
you '11 do it,' " she replied. " 'Because at heart you are a moral man.' " 
" 'If I am, why should I have to prove it to them.'" "'Not them,' " 
Ruth responded, " 'For yourself, Harry. For the love that lives inside 
your heart.' "188 
Meanwhile, Nelson steamed with anger, incensed that Harold 
had asked for his sympathy (" 'Hell, I can't even afford the kind of 
shoes he wears.' ") and berated himself and his wife with the fact of 
his poverty(" 'I have work all my life for other folks and I don't even 
own the house I live in .... [D]on't you think I'm a fool.'"). This was 
a politics of envy and self-degradation that Betty refused to join; she 
listened quietly as he called others to plan the next day's picket: "[o]n 
several occasions, hearing him declare himself a fool, she pressed the 
pillow against her eyes and cried. "189 
Determined to maintain business as usual, Harold opened the 
store and prepared for a quiet day. The first customer was Betty 
Reed; she selected a loaf of bread and placed a dollar on the counter. 
For reasons he did not comprehend, Harold was moved by her 
friendly manner. " 'Free,' " he told her. She tried again to pay for the 
bread, but Harold pushed the money back to her. Some time later a 
little girl came into the store, wanting to buy some candy. " 'Free,' " 
Harold said, cheerfully now.190 
186 !d. at 476. 
187 !d. 
188 !d. 
189 !d. at 478. 
190 !d. at 479. 
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When the pickets arrived, Harold put a sign in the store window 
announcing simply " 'FREE.' " The crowd outside was conf\}sed. 
Slowly Nelson Reed entered the store; others followed. Harold 
shouted, " 'All free!' " People began grabbing things from the shelves. 
Nelson left empty-handed, while the others loaded up with food and 
other items.191 
Within an hour, the store was empty, and Harold sought to ca~ 
his mind. Nelson appeared at the door. "'All gone,' Harold said, 'My 
friend, Mr. Reed, there is no more.' "192 
"Mr. Green," Nelson Reed said coldly. "My wife bought a loaf of 
bread in here this mornin'. She forgot to pay you. I, myself, have come 
here to pay you your money." 
"Oh," the grocer said. 
He rang the register with the most casual movement of his finger. The 
register read fifty-five cents . 
Nelson Reed held out a dollar. 
"And two cents tax," the grocer said. 
The man held out a dollar. 
"After all," Harold Green said. "We are all, after all, Mr. Reed, in 
debt to the government." 
He rang the register again. It read fifty-seven cents. 
Nelson Reed held out a dollar.t93 
Many readers conclude that fifty-five cents was a fair price for the loaf 
of bread, that it is the price charged at H~old's other s.tores. It might 
be a bit higher because of added security costs, or perhaps a bit lower, 
reflecting lower rent, but surely the profit is somewhere closer to fif-
teen than forty.t94 
This story locates market transactions within a complex social 
world. It is contract theory pushing beyond current substantive un-
conscionability, beyond medieval just-price doctririe. There is a profit 
to be made by charging more in low-income African-American neigh-
borhoods because white racism creates and maintains commercial 
boundaries.195 Geographical distance, inadequate transportation serv-
ices, racial and sexual harassment, and systematic violence restrict al-
ternatives available to black consumers. The profit is there to be 
made because of race, class, and gender su.bordination.t96 
191 Id. at 480-81. 
192 !d. at 481. 
193 ld. at 482. 
194 Following the suggestion of Deborah Waire Post, I use this story as part of the assigned 
reading in my contracts class. See HoM, KASTEL Y & PoST, CoNTRACTING LAw: A SET OF 
COURSE MATERIAls (forthcoming 1996). 
195 See generally Austin, A Nation of Thieves, supra note 44. 
196 See articles cited supra note 44. · 
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In A Loaf of Bread, exchange is foundational to human society; 
people who live in the neighborhood need Harold Green's store and 
he needs them. These needs are material, social, and political: they 
are for food, money, individual dignity, and human connection. Con-
tract is a device through which these needs can be satisfied and 
through which social connection can be maintained. Contract is also a 
serious threat to human society. Contract can aggravate inequalities 
caused by violence, exploitation, racism, and patriarchy. Contract that 
exploits, marginalizes, or renders some powerless to affect important 
conditions of their lives reduces human society, undermining the pos-
sibility of human connection. Contract constitutes society only as it is 
other~regarding as well as self-interested. McPherson's story is a work 
of ironic contract theory. 
Some readers will dismiss. the possibility of equal exchange 
presented in A Loaf of Bread as idealistic and naive, insisting that self-
iiiterest is "real" and respect between unequals "unreal." Others will 
think, with Professor Richard Epstein, that "freedom of contract" 
ought not be "restrained" by concerns of justice either because mar-
ket transactions are almost always just and the occasions of injustice 
are too few to warrant the costs of attention or because injustice is too 
complex to be addressed through contract law.l97 These responses 
raise questions about how "reality" is constituted and how "justice" is 
conceived. For what purpose is it beneficial to conceive of people as 
autonomous, rational, and self-interested, and what are the costs of 
this view? Who benefits and who is burdened by naming "self-inter-
ested" exchange as "natural" and deviations from that, including vari-
ations caused by concern for others, "artificial" or "external?" Who 
benefits and who is burdened by an understanding of "the market" as 
amoral? These questions illuminate an important aspect of contract 
theorizing, involving perceptions of social reality. While some have 
characterized the differences among contract theories according to 
what values, "policies," or politics each features, 198 it is also useful to 
note differences in "background assumptions" about human life and 
social connection reflected in different theories. In this aspect, differ-
ent contract theories appear not only richly diverse, but deeply con-
flicted. They cannot be reconciled into a comfortable celebration of 
"complexity" or "difference."199 Just contract law requires irony, the 
ability to hold "incompatible things together because both or all are 
197 See Richard Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 293, 305-
15 (1975). 
198 See, e.g. , Farnsworth, supra note 105 (bemoaning theory); Feinman, The Significance of 
Contract Theory, supra note 12 (featuring different politics of different theories); Robert A. Hill-
man, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory , 67 TEx. L. REv. 103 (1988) (offering reconciliation). 
199 Compare SMART, supra note 112, at 164-65: 
(I]t is law's power to define and disqualify which should become the focus of feminist strat-
egy rather than law reform as such. . . . Law cannot be ignored precisely because of its 
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necessary and true. "200 Work on equal exchange theory offers one 
possibility of ironic contract theory. 
V. CoNSENT THEORY 
Contemporary work on consent provides another area for devel-
opment of contract theory. There is now a rich interdisciplinary litera-
ture that interrogates modern notions of consent and their relevance 
to issues of justice. In law, the phrase volenti non fit injuria was 
claimed, coined, or created by nineteenth-century legal theorists. It is 
a Latin phrase that has been given much greater significance in Anglo-
' American law than it ever had in Roman law: given life in translation, 
it means "no injustice can be done to him who consents. "201 Follow-
ing this idea, much emphasis is put on whether or not a person has 
consented to the behavior or arrangement involved. The assumption 
that consent would legitimate the behavior is seldom interrogated. 
This pattern is evident in contract law and also in popular political 
debate. It has been featured in discussion of consensual relationships 
between college professors and students.202 Some have argued that 
sexual relationships between professors and adult students should be 
respected, that schools should not condemn such relationships, be-
cause to do so would be to treat students as incompetent. Others have 
argued that recognition of differences in power, particularly if the stu-
dent is a woman and the professor a man, requires a school to assume 
that the student was not capable of reasoned consent. Thus, the 
choice seems to be between honoring the student by approving the 
relationship or disrespecting the student by prohibiting the relation-
ship. This is where familiar contract theory fails us. We need a third 
alternative. We need better tools to analyze interconnections among 
consent, power, and justice. 
Professor Deniz Kandiyoti, a sociologist, coined the term "patri-
archal bargain" to describe the context of women's actions under dif-
ferent patriarchal systems: "I will argue that women strategize within 
a set of concrete constraints that reveal and define the blueprint of 
power to define, but feminism's strategy should be focused on this power rather than on 
constructing legal policies which only legitimate the legal forum and the form of law. 
See also BRUCE LINCOLN, DISCOURSE AND lHE CREATION OF SOCIETY (1989) (on the ways 
that discourse constructs and reconstructs society); MAruo VARGA LLOSA, THE STORYTELLER 
93 (1989) (on the importance of naming and story-telling to the creation and maintenance of 
society). 
200 Haraway, supra note 47. 
201 Terence Ingman, History of the Defence of Valenti Non Fit Injuria, 26 Ju ruo. REv. 1 
(1980); A.J.E. Jaffey, Volenti Non Fit Injuria , 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 87 (1985). 
202 See, e.g., DeNeen L. Brown, U-Va. May Limit Faculty-Student Sex Liaisons , WASH. PosT, 
Mar. 25, 1993, at Bl; Dan Froornkin, Professor's Group Seeks the Right to Sleep with Consenting 
Students, SEATTLE TIMES, July 24, 1994, at A14; Bob Sipchen, A Lesson in Love?, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 1994, at El. 
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what I will term the patriarchal bargain of any given society, which 
may exhibit variations according to class, caste, and ethnicity. "203 By 
tying the content of women's choices to the nature of patriarchy, 
rather than to the capacity or incapacity of women's judgment, 
Kandiyoti offers a useful tool for contract theory. Her approach in 
effect reverses the idea that consent justifies behavior, assuming in-
stead that the behavior must be examined first, before one can under-
stand the meaning of consent.204 
Professor Judith Lorber, a health care expert, has used 
Kandiyoti's notion of a patriarchal bargain to analyze women's con-
sent tq: the relatively invasive procedure of in vitro fertilization in 
cases of male infertility.205 "Alth~ugh in vitro fertilization was origi-
nally developed to bypass blocked or missing Fallopian tubes, it is now 
also the treatment of choice in cases of male infertility due to low 
sperm count, poor sperm motility, or badly shaped sperm." Under 
this procedure, a woman must undergo hormonal stimulation, 
sonagrams, and intravaginal or intra-abdominal procedures, often 
under general anesthesia. Numerous authors have questioned the va-
lidity of this procedure, comparing the high emotional and financial 
costs to women and the relatively low rates of live births.206 Lorber 
looks closely at the contexts in which women are asked to consent to 
203 Deniz Kandiyoti, Bargaining with Palriarchy, 2 GENDER & Soc'Y 274, 275 (1988). 
204 In addition, Kandiyoti's theory assumes that bargaining is done by women from positions 
of relative powerlessness, and this assumption also helps one separate the terms of th e agree-
ment from the quality or rationality of women's consent. Kandiyoti's use of the word "bargain" 
in this context is itself a conscious critique of dominant Anglo-American contract thinking. She 
explains: 
Like all terms coined to convey a complex concept, the term patriarchal bargain represents 
a difficult compromise. It is intended to indicate the existence of set rules and scripts regu-
lating gender relations, to which both genders accommodate and acquiesce, yet which may 
nonetheless be contested, redefined, and renegotiated. Some suggested alte rnatives were 
the terms contract, deal, or scenario; however, none of these fully captured the fluidity and 
tension implied by bargain. I (know] . . . that the term bargain commonly denotes a deal 
between more or less equal participants, so it does not accurately apply to my usages, which 
clearly indicates an asymmetrical exchange. However, women as a rule bargain from a 
weaker condition. 
!d. at 286 n.l. Perhaps, this passage suggests, a contract theory that assumes relative equality is 
incapable of recognizing gender hierarchy; perhaps such a theory will fail to develop a complex 
understanding of women's consent and the consent of subordinated men. An alternative theory 
is needed. 
205 Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bargain? Women 's Consent to In Vitro Fertili-
zation in Male Infertility, 4 HYPATIA 23 (1989). 
206 Among the studies cited by Lorber are E.H. BARUCH ET AL., EMBRYOS, ElHICS, AND 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1988); G. COREA ET 
AL., How NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN (1987); C. OVERALL, ETHics 
AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (1987); B. KATZ ROTIIMAN, RECREATfNG 
MoTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCCETY (1989); P. SPALLONE 
& D.L. STEINBERG, MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC PROGRESS 
(1988); and M. STANWORTH, REPRODUCTCVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD, AND 
MEoiCCNE (1987). 
179 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
in vitro fertilization and compares these to circumstances in which 
men and women are asked to consent to kidney donation.20 7 Using 
the concept of patriarchal bargain, Lorber questions the justice of in 
vitro fertilization as treatment for male infertility. Lorber argues that 
the two reasons women most frequently give for their agreement to 
this procedure-that she wants her partner's biological child or that 
she altruistically wants to give him a chance to have a biological 
child-can be understood only after examining the medical system's 
treatment of her interest as coextensive with his, the subordinate sta-
' tus of women in marriage, and the social practice of assigning respon-
sibility for childlessness ·to women. These limitations on women's 
choices, Lorber argues, are unjust, regardless of individual women's 
consent. 
Professor David A. Gerber, a social historian, challenges notions 
of consent employed in historical analysis of "freak" shows.208 Gerber 
asks, "If an individual consents, by virtue of what appear to be acts of 
free choice, to being degraded, exploited, or oppressed, does that act 
of consent end the moral problem that his or her situation seems to 
constitute?" He interrogates the now popular construction of Otis 
"the Frogman" Jordan (the African-American man with deficient, 
poorly functioning limbs who appeared at the 1984 New York State 
Fair), Charles Sherwood Stratton (the working class boy whom P.T. 
Barnum promoted as Tom Thumb), and others as "entertainers" and 
"performers" who unproblematically chose their "careers." 
For centuries people with visible physical anomalies ... have consented 
to display these anomalies in public and for money. How are we to eval-
uate the quality of that consent-especially in light of the extent to 
which people with physical anomalies have experienced broad and abid-
ing social oppression and marginalization? By what criteria may we 
judge that consent fictive or credible? Under any circumstance, should 
that consent necessarily have any weight at all in reaching a judgment 
about the morality of such a display?209 
Drawing on Don Herzog's Happy Slaves,210 Gerber develops a set of 
"significant preconditions" for effective choice and consent, which in-
clude the existence of alternatives, a social environment that allows an 
individual to play a variety of different roles, "occasions for choice"-
times when one may exercise independent agency, physical and 
mental capacity to affect choices, information about alternatives, and 
sufficient time and physical and mental security to allow evaluation of 
options. Gerber also elaborates a set of "cautions," or guidelines, for 
207 Lorber chose this area because there have been extensive studies of consent for kidney 
donation. Lorber, supra note 185, at 24. 
208 David A. Gerber, Volition and Valorization in the Analysis of the 'Careers' of People Ex· 
hibited in Freak Shows, 7 DISABIUTY, HANDICAP & Soc'y 53 (1992). 
209 Jd. 
210 DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRrnouE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989). 
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interpretation of individual choices: (1) one cannot necessarily infer 
consciousness from behavior-apparently voluntary choices may be 
the products of volition, but also of apathy, or lack of alternatives; (2) 
one ought not to assume that a person who appears to be content with 
a bad situation consents to that situation-"[s]he may not understand 
her situation, let alone how she came to it, or she may lack the motiva-
tion to change a situation she knows to be bad"; and (3) one ought not 
to assume that because a person has made a choice, she has chosen all 
of the consequences that flow from that choice-"there may be unin-
tended and often undesired consequences from any course of action, 
which we would not choose if they were presented to us individually, 
as part.pf a single set of options. "211 
Using these guidelines, Gerber argues that "the complex acts by 
whi~jt those displayed [in "freak" shows] may be said to have con-
sented to their situation considerably strain our understanding of con-
sent." Regarding Charles Stratton ("Tom Thumb"), for example, 
Gerber concludes that Stratton was a "tragic" figure, "a prisoner of 
conditions over which he, as a dwarf, had little control and which both 
profited and humiliated him."212 Yet this understanding of consent 
must be ironic: to see Stratton as a victim of severe injustice is not to 
deny that Stratton was also a "mature man with the intellectual re-
sources to see that much of his life was a masquerade."213 At times, 
contract thinking has posed a rigid dichotomy between incapacity and 
competence, as if every situation must fit into one or the other: either 
the person was competent, and her consent is "respected," or she was 
incapable, and her consent is disregarded. In a contract theory about 
power, though, the focus should not be on the person's capacity, but 
rather on the use or abuse of power by others. To say P.T. Barnum 
unjustly exploited Charles Stratton is not to judge Stratton's individ-
ual capacities. 
In a different but related project, Professor Carl Gutierrez-Janes, 
a literary critic, identifies a Chicana critique of consent in the work of 
Anna Castillo214 and Cherrie Moraga.215 "The artists explored here 
repeatedly ask to what extent Mexicanas and Chicanas have 'free' 
choices in either the colonial or contemporary contexts. Their ap-
proaches suggest that consent, as figured in the great wealth of legal-
cultural material surrounding us, remains an essentially symbolic 
211 Gerber, supra note 188, at 57. 
212 /d. at 67. 
213 /d. 
214 ANA CASTILLO, THE MIXOUIAHUALA LETTERS (1986); Ana Castillo, An Idyll, in WoMEN 
ARE NOT RosEs (1984); Ana Castillo, In My Country, in Mv FATHER WAs A T oLTEC (1988). 
215 CHERR!E MoRAGA, GIVING UP THE GHOST (1986). 
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power denied in practice."2 16 In Chicano culture, Gutierrez-lones ar-
gues, shame is used "to reinforce Chicana gender roles ... by associat-
ing Chicana violation with an act of consent." The merging of consent 
and violation, of consent and force, challenges the easy and mislead-
ing distinction between consent and coercion in Anglo-American 
political thought and invites deeper consideration of the meanings of 
consent and power among us. 
These and other writings on consent offer useful ways to under-
stand issues of power, consent, and justice. They invite contract theo-
rizing that moves beyond the reductive dualism of consent and 
nonconsent. 
It is better to think of ourselves as cyborgs than as cogs. And for 
lawyers and judges working with conflicted and complex contract law, 
cyborg thought offers the possibility of multiple, generative contract 
theories that can help us to understand, challenge, recreate, or toler-
ate each disparate piece of the ironic whole of contract. As lawyers 
we need an attitude toward contract theories and contract theorizing 
that will accept inconsistency and value contract theorizing as an 
ongoing activity. This is cyborgian meta-theory. 
216 CARL Gun~RREz-oE, RETHlNKING THE BoRDERLANDs: BETWEEN CHICANO CuL-
TURE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 110 (1995). 
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